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 Abstract 
This paper uses evidence from German-speaking central Europe to address open 
questions about the Consumer and Industrious Revolutions. Did they happen outside 
the early-developing, North Atlantic economies? Were they shaped by the “social 
capital” of traditional institutions? How were they affected by social constraints on 
women? It finds that people in central Europe did desire to increase market work and 
consumption. But elites used the “social capital” of traditional institutions to oppose 
new work and consumption practices, especially by women, migrants, and the poor. 
Although they seldom blocked new practices wholly, they delayed them, limited them 
socially, and increased their costs. 
 
JEL Classifications:  N0; N33; N43; N63; N73; N93; J13; J22; J31; J4; J7; O15; O17 
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Expanding market consumption is widely ascribed a key role in European economic 
growth before industrialization. A “Consumer Revolution” between 1650 and 1800 is 
thought to have seen the middle classes spending lavishly on luxuries and the masses 
buying cheap fashions and comestibles.1 In a parallel “Industrious Revolution”, it is 
argued, a growing demand for market goods motivated households – especially women 
and children – to re-allocate time from leisure and household production to income-
earning work. 2 New norms of market consumption and market work are supposed to 
have become self-reinforcing, drawing hitherto unused supplies of human time and 
ingenuity into productive activities and increasing the demand for new goods. These 
Consumer and Industrious Revolutions, it is believed, fuelled the agricultural 
revolution, proto-industrialization, and factory industrialization – setting the stage for 
the Industrial Revolution and modern economic growth.3 Theories of the Consumer and 
Industrious Revolutions thus have far-reaching implications not only for economic 
history but for economic development more widely. However, they also pose 
significant open questions.  
 For one thing, nearly every early modern economy – in northern, central, and 
southern Europe, as well as parts of Asia – is now supposed to have had its Consumer 
and Industrious Revolution.4 But supportive evidence – inventories showing a 
proliferation of market goods, sources hinting at longer working hours – comes almost 
                                                     
1 McKendrick (1974), esp. 197-200; Berg (1985), 169-72; Brewer and Porter (1993). 
2 De Vries (1992), esp. 106, 110, 112-4, 118-9; De Vries (1994), esp. 257, 261; De Vries (2008). 
3 De Vries (1992), esp. 106, 110, 112-4, 118-9; De Vries (1994), esp. 257, 261, 264 (quote); De Vries 
(2008), 6-9, 17, 22-8, 70-85, 93-100, 111-32. 
4 For German-speaking central Europe, see De Vries (2008), x, 19, 103-04, 123-24, 159-63, 179, 182; 
see Safley (2005), 348; Beck (2003); and Maynes (2004), 59-60. For France, see De Vries (1992), 114; 
De Vries (2008), x, 38, 51, 60, 88, 92-93, 96, 101-02, 106, 117-19, 124-27, 132, 134-39, 147-49, 157-
61, 164-8, 179, 182-85; Maynes (2004), 60. For Italy, see Belfanti and Guisberti (2000); Pinchera 
(2006), 6. For Spain, see Ringrose (1996), 287; Ramos (2004), 1-2, 30-34. For China, see Bayly 
(2004), 52; Pomeranz (2000), 94-5. For Japan, see Bayly (2004), 52, although for an opposed view see 
Saito (2005), 37-9. For applications of the Industrious Revolution thesis to economies as various as 
Scandinavia, Spain, Japan, Bangladesh, India, Britain, Flanders and the Northern Netherlands, see the 
papers presented at Session H4 (“Industrious women and children of the world?”) of the XVth World 
Economic History Congress, Utrecht, 4 Aug. 2009 [http://www.wehc2009.org]. 
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exclusively from the north Atlantic economies. Indeed, most of it applies specifically to 
the Netherlands and England which, as the early modern “miracle economies”, may 
have been exceptional in other ways.5 Until we explore the Consumer and Industrious 
Revolutions more thoroughly for later-developing economies we will not fully 
understand how crucial a shift toward market consumption and market industriousness 
actually was for modern economic growth and development. 
 This raises a second question. Consumption and work are social activities, yet 
theories of the Consumer and Industrious Revolutions invoke only two social 
institutions: the family and the market.6 This may be justified for the Netherlands and 
England, with their nuclear family households and precocious market economies. But 
most early modern European economies had active non-familial, non-market 
institutions: craft guilds, merchant associations, village communities, urban 
corporations, manorial systems, religious bodies, privileged corporate “orders”, 
political authorities, and many more.7 Political scientists regard many pre-modern 
institutions (particularly guilds and communities) as exemplars of the closely-knit and 
multi-stranded social networks that generate “social capital” – the stock of norms, 
information, sanctions, and collective action that are believed to play a key role in 
economic development.8 Social institutions and their associated social capital varied 
greatly across early modern Europe, but their impact on the Consumer or Industrious 
Revolutions has yet to be explored. 
 This leads to a third open question. These early modern “revolutions” are 
supposed to have been spearheaded by females, who increasingly purchased clothes 
and comestibles in the market, using cash they earned from reallocating time from 
                                                     
5 Berg (2005); McKendrick (1982); De Vries (2008); McCants (2006). 
6 See, e.g., De Vries (2008), 19. 
7 See Ogilvie (1996, 1997, 2003, 2007a). 
8 For positive views of this role, see Putnam et al. (1993), pp. 163-185; Putnam (2000), pp. 319, 322-3, 
325, 346-8. For a more critical evaluation, see Ogilvie (2003, 2004a, 2004b). 
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unpaid household work to market jobs.9 This might seem perfectly consistent with 
what we know about the Netherlands and England, where early modern travellers 
remarked on the astonishing degree of freedom manifested by Dutch females,10 and 
the Duke of Württemberg wrote on his 1598 visit to England that “the women have 
much more liberty than perhaps in any other place; they also know well how to make 
use of it, for they go out dressed in exceedingly fine clothes ... [England is] a paradise 
for women, a prison for servants, and a hell or purgatory for horses ... for the females 
have great liberty and are almost like masters, whilst the poor horses are worked very 
hard”.11 But in most early modern European economies women faced a huge array of 
institutional constraints on their work and consumption choices. Did these widely 
varying restrictions on women have no impact on the Consumer and Industrious 
Revolutions? 
 This paper addresses these questions by focusing on an economy in late-
developing Central Europe which, although market-oriented in many ways, had strong 
non-market institutions, which differed from those of the classic Consumer Revolution 
economies and imposed very serious economic constraints on women. The southwest 
German territory of Württemberg differed from the Low Countries and England, but 
resembled many other parts of continental Europe, in the enduring powers of its 
guilds, communities, and local religious institutions. Württemberg retained 
occupational guilds until 1862, not just in traditional handicrafts, but also in export-
oriented proto-industries, shopkeeping, and merchant trading.12 Württemberg also had 
powerful local communities, whose courts, councils, officials, and citizens’ 
                                                     
9 De Vries (1992), esp. 118-9; De Vries (1994), 261; Noordegraf / Van Zanden (1995); McKendrick 
(1974), 199-200; Berg (1985), 169-72 . 
10 See the contemporary descriptions quoted in Laurence (1994), 129-35; and Schama (1987), 404, 407-
12. 
11 Frederick Duke of Wirtemberg, “A true and faithful narrative of the bathing excursion”, in Rye 
(1865), 7, 14.  
12 See Medick (1996), esp. 65-140; Ogilvie (1997), 72-9, 106-11, 419-37; Ogilve (2004a). 
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assemblies enabled them to monitor and regulate work, leisure, consumption, 
education, marriage, sexuality, and economic transactions.13 Württemberg established 
local church courts in the 1640s which remained active until c. 1890, had the power to 
impose fines and incarceration as well as religious penances, and closely regulated 
work, consumption, sociability, sexuality, poor relief, and cultural practices.14 
Detailed micro-studies have shown how these guilds, communities, and religious 
institutions generated a rich “social capital” of shared norms, information, sanctions, 
and collective action, which significantly influenced the economic options of an 
otherwise highly market-oriented population.15 Württemberg is thus a good test case 
for exploring the Consumer and Industrious Revolutions in a late-developing 
economy permeated by the “social capital” of non-market institutions. 
 What would we expect to observe if “social capital” affected the Consumer and 
Industrious Revolutions? For one thing, traditional institutions often enforce social 
norms about labour, particularly for women, youths, and the labouring poor. So the first 
section of this paper examines whether social institutions, by regulating work and 
wages, observably changed people’s incentives and capacity to reallocate time from 
household to market production. Second, traditional institutions often enforce norms 
about commerce – who can trade, in what goods, in what ways. Section 2 therefore 
explores whether social institutions, by regulating commerce, affected how retailers 
made new market wares available to wider social strata. Third, traditional institutions 
also typically impose social norms about the quantity, quality, and style of consumption 
deemed appropriate for particular social groups – particularly women and the lower 
orders. Section 3 therefore investigates whether sumptuary controls observably affected 
                                                     
13 Ogilvie (1986); Ogilvie (1997), 42-72; Ogilvie (2003); Sabean (1990), 106, 109, 148, 160-1; Warde 
(2002), esp. 22. 
14 Popkin (1996); Ogilvie (2003). 
15 See Maisch (1992); Medick (1996); Ogilvie (1997); Ogilvie (2003); Rublack (1999); Sabean (1990); 
Warde (2002). 
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people’s consumption practices. Finally, traditional institutions often enforce norms 
about gender roles and household authority. Section 4 therefore examines whether non-
familial social institutions, by intervening in family conflicts, observably altered 
women’s ability to increase market work and market consumption. 
 
1. Social Capital and “Industriousness” 
 
For the Industrious Revolution to succeed, economic agents mainly active in household 
production and leisure – particularly women – had to be free to shift into market 
employments. They also had to be offered remuneration that motivated them to make 
this move. Historians of the Netherlands and England have pointed out two of the 
institutional preconditions for this to happen: a family system permitting women to 
work outside the household, and labour markets for both sexes – both satisfied under 
the European Marriage Pattern.16 But other institutions also affected the extent to which 
women could shift from household to market, as we see by broadening the analysis to 
other parts of Europe. 
 Württemberg, as Table 1 shows, had all the hallmarks of the European 
Marriage Pattern – late female marriage, high female celibacy, low fertility, small and 
simple nuclear-family households. Indeed, female celibacy rates and marriage age 
increased during the early modern period, as male emigration soared. Had the family 
system been all that mattered, low sex ratios and high female celibacy should have 
created generous labour market opportunities for women. 
 
 
                                                     
16 De Vries (2008), 9-19. 
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Table 1:
Women and the European Marriage Pattern in Pre-Industrial Württemberg
Benchmark Date Place Value
Mean age at first marriage for females 1575-1624 Wildberg 23.5
1659-1722 Wildberg 26.0
1693-1746 Wildberg 26.0
1658-1884 Laichingen 26.7
1652-1875 Böhringen 24.6
1700-1749 Öschelbronn 24.6
1750-1799 Öschelbronn 24.7
1800-1824 Öschelbronn 25.8
1780-1789 Neckarhausen 26.4
% of females over age 49 dying unmarried 1615-1699 Wildberg 7.8
1700-1799 Wildberg 15.7
1800-1834 Wildberg 17.4
1615-1834 Wildberg 14.0
% of females over age 45 dying unmarried 1625-1699 Laichingen 8.7
1700-1799 Laichingen 8.1
1800-1874 Laichingen 17.5
1625-1874 Laichingen 11.8
% of females over age 49 alive and unmarried 1717/1722 Wildberg 14.0
1744 Wildberg 13.0
% of females not currently married (all ages) 1717/1722 Wildberg 65.0
1744 Wildberg 70.0
% of females not currently married (aged 15-64) 1717/1722 Wildberg 50.0
1744 Wildberg 47.0
Sex ratio (males per 100 females) 1626/1631 Wildberg 91
1717/1722 Wildberg 82
1744 Wildberg 77
1736/1737 Bietigheim town 87
1736/1737 Bietigheim villages 86
Estimated GRR 1717/1722 Wildberg 2.08
Mean household size 1717/1722 Wildberg 4.2
% nuclear-family households 1717 Wildberg 87
Sources:  Knodel (1988), 122-3; Maisch (1992), 226-33; Medick (1996), 319, 633; Ogilvie (1997), 225-307; 
Ogilvie (2003), 40-78; Sabean (1998), 218.  
 
 Women in Württemberg did often work in the market, as I have shown in 
detail elsewhere, and as is illustrated below in Table 3. But the jobs they did and the 
wages they earned were affected by institutions other than family and market.17 For 
one thing, community officials and community courts in Württemberg often ordered 
women to work inside households for husbands, parents, or masters rather than taking 
market employment. Communities imposed obstacles on women of all marital 
                                                     
17 Ogilvie (2003, 2004b, 2004c). 
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statuses in shifting from household to market employment. This included the married 
women whose shift from household to market work would have been important in any 
Industrious Revolution. Thus, for instance, in 1742 the Ebhausen village court ordered 
a knitter’s wife who was working independently to return to her prodigal husband.18 
Likewise in 1793 a Wildberg citizen complained that the wife of an itinerant basket-
maker was collecting rags for a village paper-miller without an official licence, 
whereupon the communal assembly ordered the village to eject the couple.19  
 The Industrious Revolution also depended on unmarried women shifting from 
household production for fathers or masters (who also provided their clothes and 
comestibles) to market production in which they earned their own wages (and 
controlled their own consumption choices).20 In Württemberg, however, such 
independent unmarried women were given an especially pejorative name – 
Eigenbrötlerinnen (literally “own-breaders”) – and were routinely harassed. 
Communities tolerated them only as long as they did not encroach on guild privileges, 
demand wages above the legally fixed rate, deprive male relatives of household 
labour, take risks that might burden the welfare system, annoy respectable citizens, or 
violate other social norms. In 1646, for example, when a Wildberg citizen complained 
that “several unmarried girls are lodging with several citizens here, and should, in his 
view, be instructed to engage themselves to masters”, the community assembly 
immediately ordered all Eigenbrötlerinnen to take service within three weeks on pain of 
a fine of 3 Gulden (almost one year’s earnings for a maidservant).21 It was not 
uncommon for an Eigenbrötlerin to be ordered, like Barbara Waltz in 1687, “either to 
                                                     
18 PAE KKP Vol. III, fol. 166r, 27.4.1742. 
19 HStAS A573 Bü. 100, fol. 28r-v, 1793. 
20 De Vries (2008), 86, 97, 100-02, 128, 142-43, 151, 168, 178, 187-88. 
21 Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart [henceforth HStAS] A573 Bü. 86, fol. 265r, 24.11.1646: “bei etlichen 
burgern alhie, hielten sich etliche ledige magden auff, welche seines erachtens dahin anzuehallten 
weren, daß Sie sich verding. thetten”. 
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enter into service or, if she has an honourable offer, to get married”.22 Eigenbrötlerinnen 
who refused to shift back from market to household production could be ordered to leave 
the community, as in 1687 when the Ebhausen church court “summoned Barbara Hilber 
on account of her Eigenbrötlen [own-breading]” and “ordered her out of the hamlet”,23 
in 1717 when three Ebhausen Eigenbrötlerinnen were instructed to “move away within 
eight days”,24 or in 1752 when Barbara Kleiner was reported to the Wildberg court by 
her landlord for working independently as a lodger “although she could work as a 
servant” and was promptly ordered “to refrain from Eigenbrötlen, and instead enter into 
a proper job as a servant; otherwise she shall be driven out of the town by order of the 
authorities”.25 Communities restricted the market production even of quite mature 
spinsters, such as the 45-year-old Friderika Mohlin who in 1796 moved into lodgings 
to earn her living as a seamstress, but was ordered by the communal court “to betake 
herself back into her father’s house”.26 Many Württemberg women did work in the 
market, but many others were prevented from doing so by the officials, courts and 
assemblies of the communities they lived in. Such institutional obstacles inevitably 
limited women’s ability to contribute to any revolution in industriousness. 
 Even when women were allowed to work, institutional controls limited what 
they could earn. Württemberg, like many other pre-modern European societies, set 
legal wage ceilings for servants and labourers.27 The legislation was issued by the 
state, but the specific wage-rates were set by each community – that is, by male 
                                                     
22 PAE [henceforth Pfarrarchiv Ebhausen] KKP, Vol. I, fol. 28v, 2.2.1687: “entweder in ein diest geh. 
od, wann sie ein Ehrlich. anstand habe, sich verheurath.”. 
23 PAE KKP, Vol. I, fol. 32r, 9.12.1687: “barbara hilberin ist wegen des aigenbrötlens vorbescheyd. 
worden”; “Ist ... auß dem Fleckhen gehaisen word.”. 
24 PAE KKP, Vol. III, fol. 16, 16.4.1717: “innerhalb 8 tagen wegZiehen”. 
25 HStAS A573 Bü. 95, fol. 31v, 14.12.1752: “die Zwar dienen könnte”; “sich deß Eigebrötlens zu 
bemüßigen, hingegen in einer ordenlichen dinst zugehen, widerigen falls sie aus der Stadt von obrigkeits 
wegen getriben werden solle”. 
26 HStAS A573 Bü. 62, fol. 24r-v, 18.1.1796: “Sich wider in ihres vatters Hauße zu begeben”.  
27 Ogilvie (2003), 109-15, including examples from German economies other than Württemberg.  
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employers, since it was they who manned community institutions.28 Community 
courts also enforced these wage ceilings. To give just one example, in 1619 Hans 
Drescher demanded in the Wildberg community court that Burckhard Schlaiffer’s 
wife “be punished according to the national ordinance” because she “enticed away a 
[maid]servant whom Drescher had at his place for several years during the inflation 
period”.29 Unsurprisingly, with such communal enforcement, comparisons between 
ordinances and actual wages paid reveal few violations.30 
 
Table 2:
Female-Male Wage Ratios, Calorie Consumption, and Physical Productivity, Various Economies
Place Date Type of worker Measure Basis Ratio
Wildberg, Württemberg 1631 servants actual wages paid mean 0.35 a
Wildberg, Württemberg 1631 servants actual wages paid maximum 0.36 a
Ebhausen, Württemberg 1631 servants actual wages paid mean 0.48 a
Ebhausen, Württemberg 1631 servants actual wages paid maximum 0.23 a
Sulz, Württemberg 1631 servants actual wages paid mean 0.57 a
Sulz, Württemberg 1631 servants actual wages paid maximum 0.31 a
Gültlingen, Württemberg 1631 servants actual wages paid mean 0.40 a
Gültlingen, Württemberg 1631 servants actual wages paid maximum 0.31 a
Oberjettingen, Württemberg 1631 servants actual wages paid mean 0.57 a
Oberjettingen, Württemberg 1631 servants actual wages paid maximum 0.38 a
District of Wildberg, Württemberg 1631 servants actual wages paid mean 0.42 a
District of Wildberg, Württemberg 1631 servants actual wages paid maximum 0.36 a
Duchy of Württemberg 1642 servants wage ordinance maximum 0.33 a
Leonberg, Württemberg 1648 servants actual wages paid mean 0.34 b
Leonberg, Württemberg 1648 servants actual wages paid maximum 0.40 b
Schwäbisch Hall 1657 servants wage ordinance maximum 0.33 c
Bavaria 1688 servants monastery accounts maximum 0.40 d
Bavaria 1797-8 servants monastery accounts maximum 0.40 d
England 1388 servants statute maximum 0.67-0.69 e
England 1444-5 servants statute maximum 0.67-0.69 e
England 1564-1724 servants wage assessment median 0.60 f
England 1563-1725 servants wage assessment median 0.50 g
England 1614 servants actual wages paid mean 0.60-0.83 h
England 1689 servants actual wages paid mean 0.62 i
Belgium 19C aged 20-40 calorie consumption: actual mean 0.73 j
World Health Organization 1973 aged 20-40 calorie consumption: recommended mean 0.64 k
USA 20C soldiers physical productivity: endurance/own body-weight mean 0.80-1.00 l
USA 20C soldiers physical productivity: lifting outside weight mean 0.50 l
USA/Britain 19C farm workers physical productivity: farm-work mean 0.61-0.67 h
Biblical Near East BCE aged 20-60 value when dedicated to God mean 0.60 m
Sources:  a Ogilvie (2003), 111; HSAS A573 Bü. 5593. b HSAS A572 Bü. 56, Nro. 3. c Dürr (1995), 151. d Hartinger (1975), 612-13. e Bardsley (1999), p. 27. f Kussmaul (1981), 37, 143-4. 
g Roberts (1979), 19; Roberts (1981), 189. h Burnette (1997), 270, 275.  i Cooper, personal communication 2003; Ogilvie (2003), 111. j Bekaert (1991), 638. k Sen (1984), 250-1.
l Vogel & Friedl (1992), 93. m Woodward (1995), 112.  
                                                     
28 See, e.g., HStAS A573 Bü. 5280, fol. 46r, 9.3.1654. 
29 HStAS A573 Bü. 15, fol. 436r, 2.12.1619: “ain ehehalten, so er drescher in der theüwerungs zeit 
etlich jarlang bey sich gehabt, ein ehehalten entfiehrt, begert man solle sie der landtsordnung nach 
abstraffen”.  
30 Dürr (1995), 125-9, 151; Ogilvie (2003), 109-15. 
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 Württemberg resembled certain other pre-modern European economies in 
fixing wage ceilings for both sexes, but setting them disproportionately lower for 
women.31 As Table 2 shows, wage ordinances in Württemberg and other parts of 
southern Germany prescribed a ratio of about 0.3 between female and male wages. 
Surviving wage records, also shown in the table, indicate this was approximately the 
ratio paid. This was much lower than the 0.6-0.7 female-male productivity ratio in 
manual labour or the 0.64 female-male calorie consumption ratio observed in other 
developing economies, historical and modern. It was also much lower than the 0.6-0.7 
ratio of wages actually paid in early modern England, which correspond much more 
closely to the ratios of labour productivity and calorie consumption between the 
sexes.32 
 Wage ceilings were also imposed in the spinning sector, another major market 
employment for Württemberg women. Male employers – the weavers and the dyers – 
used their guild organizations to fix legal ceilings on spinners’ piece-rates. Spinners 
who charged above the ceiling had their yarn confiscated, and weavers who paid 
above the ceiling – e.g. to secure scarce spinning labour or obtain finer yarn – were 
subjected to whispering campaigns in the community and fined by the guild.33 
 Community and guild institutions thus enabled employers to fix wages, 
reducing potential earnings. This in turn reduced the incentives for wage-workers – 
particularly women – to reallocate time to market work, and thus their ability to 
consume market goods. 
                                                     
31 Penn (1987), 4-5, 7, 9, 13; Ogilvie (2003), 287-95. 
32 Kussmaul (1981), 37, 143-4; Roberts (1979), 19; Roberts (1981), 189; Burnette (1997), 270, 275; 
Ogilvie (2003), 111; Vogel & Friedl (1992), 93. 
33 Ogilvie (1990), 86-8; Ogilvie (1997), 354-5; Ogilvie (2003), 292, 305-08. 
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 A third way social capital affected “industriousness” in Württemberg was 
through controlling permission to do particular jobs. Women’s physical capacities and 
domestic responsibilities make them more productive, on average, in industrial and 
service activities than in farming and labouring. But guilds limited women’s work in 
most crafts and trades in early modern Europe. All guilds in Württemberg banned 
female apprentices, denying women formal vocational training.34 Guilds forbade a 
married or widowed woman to practise any craft or trade unless her husband held the 
appropriate guild license, and communal courts enforced guild complaints against her if 
she tried to practise it illegally.35 Even within a master’s own household, guilds excluded 
daughters and maidservants from central aspects of craft work, as in 1669 when the 
Wildberg weaver Hannß Schrotter was fined three weeks’ earnings by the community 
assembly because he “set his servant girl behind the loom and had her weave”.36 
 In principle, textile proto-industries created opportunities for women to 
increase their “industriousness”, in relatively low-skilled and physically undemanding 
work such as wool-combing, yarn-spinning, or warp-making. But proto-industrial 
guilds reserved all but the most poorly paid auxiliary tasks for male masters, 
journeymen and apprentices. Weaving itself was forbidden to women other than 
masters’ wives, and the guild fined illegal female weavers and anyone who employed 
them.37 Dyeing, too, was the preserve of the dyers’ guilds, which excluded all women 
except for masters’ wives and widows. Even an auxiliary task such as warp-making 
was prohibited on pain of a fine of 3-6 Gulden (1-2 years’ wages for a local 
maidservant), so as to protect the livelihoods of guild masters, and “in order that such 
daughters might be kept to other and necessary domestic tasks and business, or be 
                                                     
34 Ogilvie (2003), ch. 3. 
35See the examples in Ogilvie (2008) and Ogilvie (2003), chs. 4-5. 
36 HStAS A573 Bü. 92, fol. 5v, 1.11.1669: “Sein dienst mägdtlin ... hindern Stuehl zue sez. vnd weeben 
zuelaß.”. For further examples of such prohibitions, see Ogilvie (2003), 109-15. 
37 For examples, see Ogilvie (2004a), 304-7. 
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caused to enter into honourable service”.38 Guilds in nearly all other crafts and trades 
imposed similar restrictions. This left spinning, farming, and labouring as the only 
major employments in which women could work freely. 
 The economic impact of such institutional constraints can be seen in a database 
of 2,828 observations of women and men working, extracted from c. 7,000 pages of 
court records for two Württemberg communities between 1646 and 1800, whose 
results are summarized in Table 3.39  
 The institutional constraints we have discussed did not prevent women from 
working in the market, as shown by the fact that less than one-third of all observed 
work by females was in household production (housework, care, and healing). But, as 
Table 3 shows, the most important market activities for women were not the industrial 
and commercial occupations most suited to female physical capacities and domestic 
responsibilities. Rather, they were those that were unguilded, particularly heavy farm-
work and day-labour, which together made up nearly one-third of all observed work 
by females. All industrial sectors combined (craft, proto-industry, spinning, and 
milling) made up only one-fifth of women’s observed work, compared to nearly one-
third for men. Within industry, men carried out 90 per cent of guilded activities, 
women 90 per cent of unguilded ones. It was easier for women to get jobs doing 
heavy farm work and manual labour than to break into the male preserve of guilded 
industry.40  
  
                                                     
38 Troeltsch (1897), 435-53; here article 20, 446: “dergleichen Töchtern zue andern vnd nohtwendigen 
hauss Arbaiten vnd geschäfften Anzuehallten, oder sich In Ehrliche Dienst einzuelassen verursacht 
werden”. 
39 For detailed discussion of this database and its results, see Ogilvie (2003, 2004b, 2004c, 2008b). 
40 Ogilvie (2003), 320-52. 
13 
Table 3:
Observed Work According to Sex and Marital / Household Status, Wildberg 1646-1800 and Ebhausen 1677-1800
Sex and household status Agriculture Guilded craft
Guilded proto-
industry
Unguilded 
craft (esp. 
spinning) Mill Tavern Commerce Labour Service Housework Care Healing
Marginal 
occupations Total
no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. %
Daughters 30 22 2 1 3 2 30 22 0 0 0 0 2 1 4 3 2 1 16 12 13 10 0 0 34 25 136 100
Maids 43 40 0 0 2 2 10 9 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 19 18 15 14 0 0 15 14 107 100
Wives 81 20 17 4 9 2 34 9 10 3 18 5 12 3 7 2 4 1 111 28 43 11 8 2 43 11 397 100
Widows 58 33 3 2 11 6 16 9 11 6 5 3 5 3 8 5 5 3 25 14 17 10 6 3 4 2 174 100
Indep. unmarried women 34 27 0 0 0 0 42 33 0 0 0 0 2 2 5 4 7 6 8 6 14 11 1 1 13 10 126 100
Unknown status 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 50 0 0 0 0 1 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 100
Total females 246 26 22 2 25 3 132 14 23 2 23 2 23 2 24 3 18 2 180 19 102 11 15 2 109 12 942 100
Sons 88 42 26 12 12 6 4 2 12 6 2 1 3 1 7 3 7 3 6 3 3 1 0 0 42 20 212 100
Male servants 108 50 25 12 4 2 1 0 27 12 2 1 1 0 15 7 1 0 3 1 3 1 0 0 27 12 217 100
Husbands 405 29 198 14 170 12 8 1 119 8 54 4 56 4 75 5 63 4 58 4 25 2 26 2 146 10 1403 100
Widowers 6 33 0 0 2 11 0 0 4 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 17 3 17 0 0 0 0 18 100
Indep. unmarried men 4 15 1 4 1 4 3 12 1 4 0 0 1 4 1 4 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 13 50 26 100
Unknown status 1 10 0 0 0 0 1 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 50 2 20 0 0 1 10 0 0 10 100
Total males 612 32 250 13 189 10 17 1 163 9 58 3 61 3 98 5 76 4 72 4 35 2 27 1 228 12 1886 100
Total persons 858 30 272 10 214 8 149 5 186 7 81 3 84 3 122 4 94 3 252 9 137 5 42 1 337 12 2828 100
Source:  PAW KKP Vols. I-VII (1646-1800); Pfarrarchiv Ebhausen, KKP Vols. I-VII (1674-1800).
Notes:
Agriculture = all forms of agricultural work and commerce.
Guilded craft = all guilded activities except for worsted-weaving.
Guilded proto-industry = making and trading in worsted cloths.
Unguilded craft = spinning, seamstressing, knitting, brewing, attending or holding spinning-bees.
Mill = operating mill, transporting materials to or from mill.
Tavern = operating or serving in tavern.
Commerce = as merchant, shopkeeper, peddler, or private person.
Labour = carting, day-labouring, building, repairing, military work.
Service = teaching, music, writing, magic, housekeeping, laundry, barbering, bathing, prostitution, miscellaneous service.
Housework = indoor and outdoor household chores, providing lodgings.
Healing = as barber-surgeon, physician, Feldscherer, bathman, Kleemeister, shepherd, midwife, sworn woman, private person.
Marginal occupations = doing errands, gathering, stealing.  
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 Institutional barriers were thus reflected in economic outcomes. In early 
modern Württemberg, women could and did work in the market, but guild institutions 
excluded them from the secondary and tertiary occupations in which their 
productivity, and hence their potential earnings, were highest. This forced female 
workers into sectors such as labouring and farmwork in which their productivity, and 
hence their potential earnings, were low – even before they were further depressed by 
institutional wage ceilings. This inevitably stifled market “industriousness” by 
females, and the market consumption it might have fuelled. 
 Religious institutions also affected how industrious people could be. Spinners, 
for instance, sought to minimize their costs by organizing nocturnal spinning-bees 
(Spinnstuben) to share light and reduce tedium. But church elders and male 
householders used communal councils and church courts to outlaw such gatherings, 
which they saw as fostering gossip and sexual license.41 Barring spinning-bees 
increased spinners’ costs, however, as Michel Kuch’s wife pointed out in 1734 to the 
Ebhausen church court, explaining that “[working] alone she does not earn her 
lighting costs”.42 Religious prohibitions thus affected women’s incentives to do 
market work and, in turn, their ability to consume market goods. 
 Sabbath regulations operated analogously, prohibiting “all business [Geschäft] 
in house and field, inside and outside the village”, not just on Sundays, but also on 
Saturday nights, Days of Prayer and Repentance, and other holy days.43 Existing 
community officials such as constables, watchmen, and gate-wards were adjured to 
keep a diligent eye out for Sabbath work,44 and special officers called Kirchenrüger 
                                                     
41 See Medick (1984); Ogilvie (2003), 29, 31, 116, 118, 121-3, 126, 166, 184-5, 208, 241, 274, 277, 
284, 313; Ogilvie (2004b), 355. 
42 PAE KKP, Vol. III, fol. 178r, 28.2.1734: “weil sie alleine das liecht nicht verdiene”. 
43 PAE KKP, Vol. V, 6.5.1759, p. 111: “alles Geschäfft zu Haus- und feld, inn und außer dem flecken”; 
see also PAE KKP, Vol. II, fol. 121v, 2.3.1714. 
44 PAW [henceforth Pfarrarchiv Wildberg] KKP, Vol. I, fol. 204r, 18.11.1659. 
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were appointed by the communal church courts to patrol the streets, carry out internal 
inspections of suspect households, and “eavesdrop among the houses”.45 Ordinary 
citizens who failed to report neighbours’ Sabbath work were punished.46  
 
Table 4:
Prosecutions for Sabbath Work in Community Church Courts,
Wildberg 1646-1800 and Ebhausen 1674-1800
Total Cases Percent Female
Village or town location
Villages 547 24
Towns 665 16
Unknown 2 0
Quarter-century
1646-1673 212 19
1674-1700 298 16
1700-1724 352 24
1725-1749 223 19
1750-1774 111 18
1775-1799 18 11
Total 1214 19
Note: First two "quarter-centuries" are defined with respect to beginning-dates of church-court records for 
Wildberg (1646) and Ebhausen (1674) respectively.
Sources: PAW KKP Vols. I-VII (1646-1800); Pfarrarchiv Ebhausen, KKP Vols. I-VII (1674-1800).  
  
 Complaints in local records show that Sabbath prohibitions were binding 
constraints on rural people who wanted to allocate more time to market production.47 
As Table 4 shows, between 1646 and 1800 two small Württemberg communities 
penalized more than 1,200 cases of people working at prohibited times.48 This was 
one way social institutions restricted male industriousness more than female, since 81 
per cent of those prosecuted were men.49 Sabbath work regulation seems actually to 
                                                     
45 PAW KKP, Vol. V, fol. 341v, 17.2.1717: “unter den haüsern zu horchen”.  
46 For an example, see PAE KKP, Vol. II, fol. 34r, 12.8.1706; PAE KKP, Vol. VI, fol. 31r, 5.11.1777. 
On the legal obligation to report offences, see Dürr (1995), 247-8; Robisheaux (1989), 95-116; Ulbrich 
(1999), 243. 
47 See, for instance, PAE KKP, Vol. II, fol. 46v, 16.9.1708; PAE KKP, Vol. II, fol. 61v, 24.1.1710; 
PAE KKP, Vol. II, fol. 146r, 31.1.1716. 
48 Ogilvie (2003), 25 (Table 1.2). 
49 Ogilvie (2003), 24. 
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have increased up to c. 1750, and even in the 1750-75 period was still more intense 
than a century earlier. Only after 1775 did Sabbath regulation begin to relax, and not 
until October 1799 did the central government proclaim that “on what have hitherto 
been holy days, church services shall now be held only in the mornings, and outside 
those hours it shall be permitted to pursue occupations, businesses, and trades, both 
before and after the church service”.50 Throughout the period postulated for the 
Industrious Revolution, therefore, Württemberg’s local religious institutions limited 
people’s capacity to intensify their industriousness and, by implication, to consume 
market goods.  
 This is not to say that all early modern European societies were like 
Württemberg. Many parts of central, eastern-central, southern and nordic Europe did 
resemble Württemberg, in seeing church, state, and community institutions 
intensifying “social disciplining” – including economic regulation – between 1600 
and 1800. But other European societies – particularly, though not exclusively, on the 
north Atlantic seaboard – implemented social disciplining sporadically if at all.51 
Many European economies also had strong guilds into the late eighteenth century. But 
in England and the Low Countries guilds regulated fewer occupations, were absent in 
many towns and villages, and progressively liberalized their entry barriers and 
internal regulations progressively between 1650 and 1800.52 Local communities, as 
                                                     
50 PAW KKP, Vol. VIII, fol. 118v, 11.10.1799: “an den bißherigen Feyertagen nur am Vormittag 
Gottesdienst gehalten auser deßen Stunde aber erlaubt werden solle, sowohl vor als nach dem 
Gottesdienst dem berufs Geschäfften und gewerbe nachzugehen”. 
51 For comparative discussion of “social disciplining” and detailed references see Ogilvie (2006), 70-4. 
52 On English guilds, see Clark / Slack (1976), pp. 29, 108-09, 116; Coleman (1977), pp. 73-5; Ogilvie 
(2007b), 46-8, 50; Ogilvie (2008a); Wallis (2008). On guilds in the Low Countries, see Davids (1996); 
Davids (2003); De Vries / Van der Woude (1997), esp. pp. 162-3, 293, 298, 301-02, 340-1, 357, 582, 
634, 638; Ogilvie (2007b), 48-50; Ogilvie (2008a); Schmidt (2007); Soly (2006), 15-16; Van den 
Heuvel (2007), 24, 29, 51-3, 63, 67-8, 91-8, 147-75; Van Nederveen Meerkerk (2006), 65-77, 81-8, 
147-60, 169-73, 178-83, 239-40, 317-8. 
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well, varied across Europe in the extent to which they sought (or were able) to control 
women’s residence, work, wages, and sociability.53  
 The scholarship on “social disciplining”, guilds, communities, and women’s 
history all converge in observing an earlier and more thorough relaxation of 
institutional controls in the Low Countries, England, northern France, and a few other 
enclaves, than in central, eastern, nordic or southern parts of the continent. The 
Industrious Revolution could proceed more easily where “social capital” was relaxed, 
creating institutional interstices in which deviations from norms could be 
experimented with – particularly by women – and new work norms could be formed. 
 
2. Social Capital and Commerce 
 
The Consumer Revolution not only needed people to shift into market work and earn 
more spending money. It also needed the commercial sector to bring new market wares 
within the reach of wider social strata. This certainly corresponds with what we know of 
early modern England and the Low Countries, where shops, stalls, hawkers, and 
peddlers proliferated alongside established merchants, lowering the transaction costs of 
indulging in new market wares.54 But what happened where commerce was not so 
open? For centuries, European merchants had maintained entrenched interest-groups 
adept at securing rights to block new participants and competitive practices in 
commerce. Did these institutional privileges simply melt away in the heat of the 
Consumer Revolution? 
                                                     
53 Women’s position in different early modern European economies is discussed in Ågren and Erickson 
(2005); Ogilvie (2003); Van den Heuvel (2007); Van Nederveen Meerkerk (2006); Brewer and Vickery 
(2006). On the varying strength and impact of communal institutions on women, see Dennison / 
Ogilvie (2007); Ogilvie (2006); Ulbrich (1999). 
54 See the discussions in De Vries (2003), 61-2; De Vries (2008), 169-77, 180; Blondé, Briot, Coquery 
and Van Aert (2005); Blondé and Van Damme (2006); Van den Heuvel (2007), 177-81, 270-3. 
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 Commercial change did not prove straightforward everywhere in Europe. In 
Württemberg, for instance, trade in most agricultural and industrial goods was legally 
reserved for their immediate producers until well past 1800. Middlemen (and  
-women) were prohibited as Fürkäufer (regraters).55 Trade in craft inputs was reserved 
for the relevant guild masters, and “encroaching” middlemen were penalized. The 
export of certain wares (e.g., proto-industrial textiles) was reserved for members of 
privileged merchant associations with state monopolies. Specialized commerce was 
restricted to a specified list of “merchants’ wares” and was reserved for members of 
the guilds of merchants and shopkeepers. A few outsiders managed to secure guild 
permits or princely dispensations (Konzessionen), but these were granted only if one 
paid a fee and proved it would “correspond to the needs of the community”.56  
 These were not just formal regulations but were enforced in practice. Into the 
later eighteenth century, those who bought up foodstuffs for resale were not regarded 
as reducing transaction costs but instead were prosecuted as black-market “regraters” 
encroaching on the privileges of local farmers and guildsmen. In 1764, for instance, 
the Wildberg community assembly was mobilized by a local baker who complained 
that “the so-called Schmalzin [lit. “Lard-Woman”] is buying up grain here and there, and 
selling it again at a higher price on offer to the citizens here, and through this 
commercium is causing damage to the bakers here”.57 In 1793, likewise, five Wildberg 
citizens separately made use of the community assembly to complain that “in 
Liebelsberg and Schönbronn, lard is being bought up by a Fürkaufferin [female 
regrater] from Teinach”. Local officials immediately sent out written reminders to all 
                                                     
55 See the prohibitions against “regrating” in HStAS A304 Bü. 968, fol. 68r-72r (19.12.1763). 
56 See Weisser (1780), 329-30; Ogilvie (1997), 70-9; Sabean (1990), 160. Quotation from “Revidirte 
allgemeine Gewerbe-Ordnung” (5 Aug 1836), in Reyscher (1828ff), Vol. 15.2, art. 114. 
57 HStAS A573 Bü. 95, fol. 28v, 17.12.1764: “die sogenannte Schmalzin Kauffe hin und wider früchten 
auf, verkauffe solche wider in einem höhern Pretio auf beutt an die hiesige burgere und verusache 
durch dises Commercium ... denen hiesigen becken einem Schaden”; for the plainant’s occupation, see 
PAW Bd. 7, Eheregister, 31.10.1753. 
19 
surrounding communities about the illegality of regrating, urged citizens to report 
every illegal middleman or -woman instantly, and instructed officials in the woman’s 
locality to “warn her against further regrating and the penalties it involves”.58  
 Guilds and merchant associations also restricted competition and innovation in 
commerce. Between 1650 and 1797, the exclusive Calw Worsted Trading 
Association, a guild-like association of 20-45 privileged merchant-dyers, prevented all 
outsiders from introducing new worsted varieties that would circumvent the 
association’s state privileges. Conversely, when the Calw merchants tried to introduce 
innovations themselves, the regional weavers’ guilds blocked them, as in 1698 when 
the Wildberg guild lobbied against several merchants “who have begun to make new 
sorts of Schlickh Cadiß [lit. warp-worsted], and put them out to be woven, which they 
are not allowed to do”.59 Together, the weavers’ guilds and the merchants’ association 
hindered the introduction of innovative worsted varieties into the Württemberg market 
long after they had become widespread in guildless worsted industries in England, the 
Low Countries, and France.60  
 In many other Württemberg crafts, too, guilds erected barriers against simple 
commercial innovations such as peddling, which would have reduced transaction 
costs. A Wildberg nail-smith, for instance, complained in 1742 that a village woman 
was encroaching on his guild privileges by peddling nails, and got her jailed by his 
communal assembly.61 In 1784 a guilded tawer complained that “the peddling of Jews 
with hides is getting so out of hand that no tawer can sell anything any more”; the 
communal assembly and the district authorities responded with prohibitions and 
                                                     
58 HStAS A573 Bü. 100, fol. 37r, 1793: “in Liebelsperg und Schömbronn werde das Schmalz durch 
eine Fürkaufferin aus deinach ... aufgekauft”; “vor weiterm Aufkauf und der darauf gesezten Strafe”. 
59 HStAS A573 Bü. 851 (1698-9), fol. 25r-v: “alß welche Neüe Sortten von Schlickh Cadiß angefangen 
Zumachen, und zuweben geben, dessen Sie aber nicht befuegt gewesen”. 
60 Ogilvie (2004a), 314-22; Troeltsch (1997), 84-6, 119, 142-3, 151-2, 161-9, 189-90. 
61 HStAS A573 Bü. 95, fol. 6v, 25.1.1742. 
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penalties.62 In 1787 a guilded weaver complained that “through the peddling of the 
Jews he and other craftsmen are suffering much interference and weakening of their 
livelihoods”. His complaint led the community assembly to threaten a 20-Reichstaler 
fine to anyone buying from Jews.63 
 Even for legitimate “merchants’ wares” that were not the exclusive privilege 
of local farmers or craftsmen, shopkeepers’ guilds often blocked new commercial 
practices.64 Peddling and hawking were banned altogether, and shopkeepers mobilized 
their own guild officials, communal courts, and state institutions to prevent any 
encroachment on their monopolies.65 In 1652, for instance, a poor labourer’s widow in 
Wildberg was only granted a princely dispensation to open a corner shop when she 
petitioned that her sole son was a cripple, she was supporting four younger daughters 
from alms and ribbon-weaving, and the local princely bureaucrat himself guaranteed 
that she and her son would “sell nothing other than the ribbons they themselves make, 
kindling wood, and such poor things, so the shopkeepers will suffer no injury or 
encroachment”.66 It was far more typical for communal and state officials to support the 
objections of the shopkeepers’ guilds against new retailers and competitive practices. In 
1711, for instance, the Württemberg Ministry of the Interior ordered district governors 
to report all licensed shopkeepers in their districts. Sixty-five lists were duly 
delivered, along with details on how illegal retailing was being controlled. To give 
just one example, Maria Christothora Weysin, a converted Jew’s widow in 
                                                     
62 HStAS A573 Bü. 95, fol. 22v, 2.1.1784: “das Hausiren der Juden mit fell nehme so sehr überhand, 
daß ein Weisgerber nichts mehr verkaufen könne, er bitte also um ein Verbott”. 
63 HStAS A573 Bü. 99, fol. 67v, probable date April 1787, #197 and #198: “durch das Hausiren der 
juden geschehe seinem und anderm Handwerkern viel Abbruch und Schwächung der Nahrung, Er bitte, 
solcher abzustellen”. 
64 “Revidirte allgemeine Gewerbe-Ordnung” (5 Aug 1836), in Reyscher (1828ff), Vol. 15.2, esp. 
Abschnitt 3, art. 106-14. 
65 Ogilvie (2003), 167-72, 263-5. 
66 HStAS A573 Bü. 1149, fol. 32v-33v, 16.7.1652: “vnd auch den Krämerey., Sintenmahlen Sie nichts 
Alß selbstmachende bändlen schwevelhölzlen vnd derogleich. schlechte Sach faihl zue haben v.mag, 
Kein schad od. eingriff gethan würde”.  
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Pfaffenhofen, could not show any princely dispensation or guild permit, “for which 
reason, upon the complaint of the aforementioned two [guilded] shopkeepers, she was 
forbidden and ordered to refrain from this encroachment until she presents a 
legitimate princely order”.67 Shopkeepers also used community institutions to defend 
themselves against new entrants and commercial practices, as in 1784 when two 
members of the merchants’ and shopkeepers’ guild complained in the Wildberg 
community assembly that “the Jews and itinerant rural traders are committing great 
interference against the merchants, through their prohibited peddling”. The assembly 
immediately ordered all citizens “to report rural traders, Jews and other persons 
trading counter to [the national law-code] to the district authorities” and instructed the 
district excise-officer and the village authorities to watch out for violators.68  
 As such complaints illustrate, a black-market “informal sector” existed, in 
which low-cost traders illegally congregated. Thus, for instance, in 1711 the guilded 
shopkeepers of Bottwar sought to outlaw “the hedge- or barn-retailers ... who have not 
been apprenticed to the trade anywhere, whose wives and children beg, and who hold 
community citizenship in no locality, but with their retailing are very burdensome and 
cause great curtailment to the public and to the entire trade”.69 The guilded 
shopkeepers of Backnang opposed the trading of Italian peddlers who “sell spices 
which they have not got inspected by anyone, and almost more cheaply than the 
shopkeepers here can purchase them in Frankfurt”. The Backnang guild also objected 
                                                     
67 HStAS A228 Bü. 713 (1711), #20 (Amt Güglingen): “dahero auf vorbemellt- Beeder Crämern 
Beschwehren, diese Stimppelej, biß auf beybring: und Legitimirung gndst: Befelchs. Ihro Nidergelegt 
und Verbotten word.” 
68 HStAS A573 Bü. 95, fol. 6r-v, 22v, 2.1.1784: “die Juden und vagirende Land-Krämer machen denen 
Handels Leuten durch verbottenes Hausiren in der Stadt und auf denen Amts Orten grosen Abbruch. Er 
bitte also, diesem zusteuren”; “das Hausiren der Juden mit fell nehme so sehr überhand, daß ein 
Weisgerber nichts mehr verkaufen könne, er bitte also um ein Verbott”; “die Land Krämer, Juden und 
andere darwider handlende Personen dem OberAmt anzuzaigen”. 
69 HStAS A228 Bü. 713, #6, 20.11.1711: “Hackhen: oder Schewren Krämmern, ... welche die handlung 
Nirgents Erlehrnet, deren Weiber und Kinder Bettlen, und an Keinem ohrt Verburgert sein; doch 
darneben mit Ihrem Cramm, dem publico, alß den gesampten Handlung sehr beschwehrlich und großen 
abbruch thun.” 
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to married women selling soap and other washing products at weekly markets 
“without being able to show any permits to do so”.70  
 Poor women and gypsies traded in illegal trinkets, as in 1780, when Agnes 
Dorothea Lampart from the village of Ebhausen visited a tavern to “order a bunch of 
garnets [from a gypsy], on commission for a female relative”.71 Poor women traded in 
“gathered” goods whose sale was not reserved for farmers or craftsmen, as in 1798 
when the Elisabeta Walburge Luz, a migrant lodger in Ebhausen, “was trading in nuts 
and the like”.72  
 Had these low-cost traders been able to establish themselves as a competitive 
fringe in the core commercial sector, they would have diminished the guilded 
retailers’ monopoly profits, as indeed occurred in the retail sectors of England and the 
Low Countries after c. 1650.73  But in Württemberg, the retailers’ guilds increased the 
costs and risks of illegal traders by imposing fines and confiscations, restricting them 
to the peripheral goods (uninspected spices, soap, illegal trinkets, nuts) and locations 
(hedges, barns, taverns, lodgings) typical of the “informal sector”, where they were 
less likely to be prosecuted but also less accessible to customers. These characteristics 
are themselves clear indications of how successfully the Württemberg retailers’ guilds 
excluded low-cost, informal traders from core commercial activities. 
 It is sometimes claimed that throughout early modern Europe guild regulations 
were easy to circumvent and had no real economic effect. If this were true, one should 
observe no quantitative difference in economic outcomes between economies where 
                                                     
70 HStAS A228 Bü. 713, #10, 7.10.1711: “so doch Keine Erlaubniß vorzue weißen Hatten”; “so Ihme 
niemalen beschauet würde Verkauffte, vnd selbiges fast wohlfailer geben, alß Sie di Hießige Krämer es 
in Franckhfurth, im Ankauff erhielten”. 
71 PAE KKP, Vol. VI, fol. 96v, 17.7.1780: “daß sie bey einem auf Commission einer base einen 
Reyhen Granaten bestelt habe”. On sumptuary prohibitions against the wearing even of modest garnet 
and coral ornaments by villagers, see HStAS A21 Bü. 224 (1712), provisions for social classes 7-9. 
72 PAE KKP, Vol. VIII, p. 134, 13.8.1798: “150 f hab sie von ihren Eltern erhalten, die sie jezt 
gröstentheils in Handel steken habe ... Sie habe mit Nuß u. d.gl. gehandelt”. 
73 Van den Heuvel (2007); Blondé, Briot, Coquery and Van Aert (2005). 
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retailing guilds were ubiquitous and strong and those where they were scattered and 
weak. In most German territories, retailing guilds survived at least until c. 1800 – in 
territories such as Württemberg until 1862 – and erected high barriers to entry which 
they policed quite strictly. In the Netherlands and England, by contrast, retailing 
guilds were not universal; those that survived progressively liberalized from the 
seventeenth century on, reducing their barriers to entry and increasingly admitting 
women, migrants, and even Jews.74  
 
Table 5:
Retail Ratios by Country, 1542 - 1911
Retail Württemberg
Other 
Germany
Northern 
Netherlands
Southern 
Netherlands England All Countries
ratio no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. %
Zero 16 21 13 12 1 2 0 0 0 0 30 10
0 - 5 49 64 28 25 1 2 0 0 0 0 78 25
5 - 10 7 10 37 33 5 10 2 15 5 9 56 18
10 - 15 0 0 24 21 6 13 1 8 13 23 44 14
15 - 20 2 3 7 6 3 6 0 0 11 19 23 7
20 - 25 0 0 2 2 13 27 1 8 7 12 23 7
25 - 30 2 3 1 1 5 10 1 8 6 11 15 5
Over 30 1 1 1 1 14 29 8 62 15 26 39 13
Total 77 100 113 100 48 100 13 100 57 100 308 100
mean 3.65 7.74 22.90 31.51 22.71 12.85
median 2.05 6.80 23.14 36.32 19.23 8.83
max 31.25 34.52 41.62 62.50 53.19 62.50
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.45 7.11 0.00
std. dev. 6.13 6.13 10.87 16.12 11.44 12.43
Notes:
Retail ratio = number of retailers per 1000 inhabitants.
Most retail ratios for Württemberg and Germany include merchants as well as retailers.
Most ratios for England, Northern Netherlands, and Southern Netherlands exclude merchants.
Dataset consists of 308 individual cities, towns and villages; it excludes observations of larger zones.
Sources:  Calculated from data in numerous archival documents and secondary works for each different country and 
community; references available from author on request.
 
 The most commonly used quantitative benchmark of the Commercial 
Revolution is the “retail ratio”, defined as the number of retailers per 1,000 
                                                     
74 On retailing guilds in the Northern Netherlands, see Van den Heuvel (2007); on the Southern 
Netherlands, see Blondé and Van Damme (2006); for comparisons with England, see the essays in 
Blondé, Briot, Coquery and Van Aert (2005). 
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inhabitants. Table 5 shows retail ratios which have been calculated for 308 European 
settlements between 1542 and 1911 – 77 for Württemberg, 113 for other German 
territories, 48 for the Northern Netherlands, 13 for the Southern Netherlands, and 57 
for England. The ratios for Germany, despite often combining retail and wholesale 
merchants, are lower than those for the Netherlands and England, which generally 
include only retailers. Low retail ratios of less than 5 per 1,000 were observed in 85 
per cent of the Württemberg sample and over one-third of the sample from other 
German territories, but hardly ever in the Netherlands and England. Conversely, high 
retail ratios of over 15 per 1,000 were observed in over two-thirds of the samples for 
England and the Netherlands, but less than one-tenth of those in Württemberg and 
other German territories. In England and the Netherlands, settlements without retailers 
were almost non-existent, whereas they comprised one-fifth of the Württemberg 
sample and over one-tenth of the sample covering other territories of Germany. 
 
Table 6:
Dataset of European Retail Ratios: Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev.
Retail ratio 308 12.9 8.8 62.5 0.0 12.4
Population 308 14342.3 1581.5 650000 55 52723.5
Log of population 308 7.8 7.4 13.4 4.0 1.7
Date 308 1769.6 1785 1911 1542 68.9
Note: Retail ratio = number of retailers per 1000 inhabitants.
Sources:  See Table 5.
 
 Of course, differences in retail ratios among countries might result from 
differences in other factors. For instance, as Table 6 shows, the settlements in the 
sample varied greatly not just in their retail ratios but in their dates of observation and 
their population sizes. Perhaps the German settlements had lower retail ratios because 
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they were observed at earlier dates or included fewer large cities? What happens when 
we control for these variables? 
 
Table 7:
Determinants of European Retail Ratios, 1542 - 1911: Tobit Regression
Explanatory variable Coefficient Marginal effect 
(at sample mean value)
Log of population 2.202*** 1.649***
(0.000) (0.000)
Date 0.027*** 0.020***
(0.000) (0.000)
England 15.209*** 13.055*** a
(0.000) (0.000)
Other Germany 3.590*** 2.740*** a
(0.001) (0.001)
Northern Netherlands 18.207*** 16.006*** a
(0.000) (0.000)
Southern Netherlands 22.099*** 20.476*** a
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant -61.402***
(0.000)
Number of observations 308
Notes:
Dependent variable is retail ratio (number of retailers per 1000 inhabitants).
For country-dummies, base category is Württemberg.
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a Effect of discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
 
 Table 7 reports the results of a Tobit regression with the retail ratio as the 
dependent variable, and population, date and country as explanatory variables. 
Settlements with larger populations had higher retail ratios, confirming that 
commercialization was associated with urbanization.75 As one might expect, 
commercialization also increased across the early modern period. But even controlling 
for urbanization and the passage of time, the country differences remain large and 
significant. There was no significant difference in retail ratios among England, the 
Northern Netherlands, and the Southern Netherlands. But Württemberg and other 
                                                     
75 Although many rural settlements also commercialized in this period, as pointed out by De Vries 
(2008), 93-5, 128. 
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German territories had significantly lower retail ratios than England and the 
Netherlands. Economic outcomes thus differed significantly between societies where 
retailing guilds were strong and those where they were more liberal. 
 The period after 1650 did see a vast expansion of retailing in the Low 
Countries and England, lowering transaction costs and bringing market wares within 
the budgets of poorer consumers.76 But this did not take place everywhere in Europe, 
as shown by this large sample of retail ratios. In parts of Europe, permission to engage 
in commerce (as well as what one could do once one had it) was inhibited by the 
social capital of entrenched interest-groups.77 Their institutional privileges hindered 
the commercial innovations that would have been required to reduce the costs of 
opening up market consumption to broader, poorer social strata. 
 
3. Social Capital and Sumptuary Regulation 
 
The Consumer Revolution not only needed more market workers with more disposable 
income, and retailers offering lower transaction costs. It also needed market 
consumption to become socially acceptable. During the Consumer and Industrious 
Revolutions in the Low Countries and England, contemporaries described social norms 
as decisively shifting toward consuming in the market – buying clothes and household 
furnishings rather than making them oneself, purchasing comestibles at shops and 
taverns rather than preparing them at home.78 In this story, new consumption norms 
arose spontaneously through the aggregated choices of individuals in households and 
markets, with other social institutions playing no role. Accurate though this picture 
                                                     
76 De Vries (2003), 61-2; De Vries (2008), 169-77. 
77 See the comparative discussions in Van den Heuvel (2007); and in Blondé, Briot, Coquery and Van 
Aert (2005). 
78 De Vries (2008), esp. 123-77. 
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may be for England and the Low Countries, can we apply it unquestioningly to other 
early modern societies? 
 Studies of early modern “social disciplining” suggest not. In many European 
societies, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw an intensification of efforts to 
regulate people’s private lives, including their consumption choices.79 Accounts of the 
Consumer Revolution in the Low Countries and England portray such “sumptuary” 
regulation as emanating solely from the central state, losing force by 1650 at latest, 
and lacking real economic impact even before that time.80 The early modern United 
Provinces (Northern Netherlands) were certainly remarkably free of sumptuary laws, 
and England enacted none after 1604.81 But evidence from other European societies – 
including Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Scandinavia, Spain, Italy, and even France 
– indicates that sumptuary regulations survived long past 1650, were supported by 
many non-state institutions, and were enforced in practice, albeit selectively according 
to the interests of the social groups that endorsed them.82 In German-speaking Central 
Europe, for instance, at least 1,350 ordinances were issued between 1244 and 1816 
regulating clothing alone, which in turn comprised only one aspect of consumption. 
Local elites shaped and enforced these sumptuary controls, and often resisted their 
ultimate abolition.83 
 Like many early modern European societies, Württemberg issued numerous 
sumptuary regulations throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
responding to pressure from different social groups. Higher social strata demanded 
sumptuary rules to demarcate their status vis-à-vis lower strata: courtiers over non-
                                                     
79 For recent surveys, see Hunt (1996); Landwehr (2000); Ogilvie (2006). 
80 De Vries (2003), 65-6; Harte (1976), 148. 
81 Hooper (1915), 448-9; Hunt (1996), 34, 40; Ross (2006), 385-6. 
82 Belfanti and Giusberti (2000), 359-61; Bulst (1993), esp. 32-8; Fairchilds (2000), esp. 420-1; 
Freudenberger (1963), 37, 40, 43, 46, 48; Hunt (1996), 17-41; Moyer (1996), esp. 231-6, 244-336; 
Roche (2000), 203-04, 279. 
83 See Bulst (1993), 32-4, 45-6; Moyer (1996), esp. 244-336.  
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courtiers, townsmen over villagers, the communal Ehrbarkeit (the “notability” 
regarded as eligible for local office) over families of the lower village strata. Men 
demanded regulation of women’s dress to define gender-specific conduct, prevent 
sexual disorder, and help resist wives’ and daughters’ demand for new fashions. 
Employers demanded regulation of servants’ dress to reduce pressure for higher 
wages. Guild masters demanded regulations to reserve exotic wares to small groups of 
rich consumers, require ordinary people to wear domestically produced textiles and 
furs, and protect their own markets against foreign competition. Churchmen and local 
elders demanded regulations to restrain worldly adornment, lavish sociability, 
drunkenness, and sexual display. Princely councillors, tax-collectors, bureaucrats, and 
military men demanded sumptuary regulations to make ordinary people spend less on 
themselves so they could pay more in taxes. This conglomeration of social pressures 
gave rise in Württemberg, as in many other European societies, to a continual flow of 
sumptuary regulations between the mid-sixteenth and the later eighteenth century. 84 
The main targets were “finery in clothing and excess in eating and drinking” – 
precisely the new forms of market consumption implied by the Industrious 
Revolution.85 As in many other European societies, sumptuary regulation became ever 
more elaborate into the eighteenth century, alongside the local administrative 
                                                     
84 For a representative selection, see “Erste Polizei-Ordnung” (30.6.1549), in Reyscher (1828ff), Vol. 
12, 149-67, here 151-3; “Zweite Polizei-Ordnung” (28.10.1644), in ibid., Vol. 13, 41-5; “Fürstl. Befehl 
in Betreff der durch den Schwäb. Kreis festgesetzten Taxen und Regeln für Dienstboten und 
Handwerkern” (15.05.1652), in ibid., Vol. 13, 114-23, esp. 120; “Dritte Polizei-Ordnung” 
(08.10.1660), in ibid., Vol. 13, 423-35; “Vierte Polizeiordnung” (17.12.1681), in ibid., Vol. 13, 577 
with note 635; “Fünfte Polizei-Ordnung” (6.12.1712), in ibid., Vol. 13, 921-6; “Erläuterung der 
Polizei-Ordnung” (2.5.1713), in ibid., Vol. 13, 759 with note 1002; “General-Ausschreiben: erinnert an 
die genaue Beobachtung der Polizei-Ordnung” (17.7.1714), in ibid., Vol. 13, 1023; Zweite 
Trauerordnung” (20.8.1720), in ibid., Vol. 13, 1182-5; “Verbot des Tragens von Hof-Livrée durch 
solche, die nicht bei Hof dienen” (18.04.1721), in ibid., Vol. 13, 1217 with n. 1199; “Verbot des 
Tragens von grünen Kleidern und Hirschfänger durch Andere, als Forstbediente” (29.03.1727), in ibid., 
Vol. 14, 1 with n. 2; “General-Rescript in Betriff der Unbefugten Nachahmung von Uniform-Kleidern 
und Farben” (6.9.1731), in ibid., Vol. 14, 91-3; “Generalrescript, betreffend die Beförderung der 
Religiosität und Sittlichkeit” (13.1.1739), in ibid., Vol. 14, 220-31, esp. article 16 (230); “Vierte 
Trauer- und Leichentax-Ordnung” (24.4.1784), in ibid., Vol. 14, 997-1015, esp. articles 4-8 (1000-2). 
85 “Fünfte Polizei-Ordnung” (6.12.1712), in Reyscher (1828ff), Vol. 13, 921-6, quotation from 921. 
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machinery for its implementation, and was only abolished at the end of the Ancien 
Régime.86 
 Local archival sources show these sumptuary norms being enforced – not 
perfectly, but enough to affect people’s economic choices. Community and church 
bodies not only issued normative exhortations against luxury and excess, but 
underpinned them with a surprisingly intensive everyday regulation of two specific 
types of consumption – clothing and comestibles. 87 When prepared in the household, 
most garments and comestibles were acceptable; when purchased in the market they 
were monitored, reported and penalized. 
 Sartorial regulation was seriously pursued by local religious and communal 
institutions in Württemberg from the later seventeenth century on. In 1660, the 
communal church court in Wildberg appointed “censors” to monitor “the excessive 
sartorial display that has got out of hand”.88 From that time on, it was not unusual for 
local church courts to admonish offenders by name and penalize them for sumptuary 
violations. To give just a few examples, in 1662, the Wildberg court reprimanded the 
son of a local weaver, “on account of very wide trousers, which fashion it is unfitting 
for him to wear”, fined him 15 Kreuzer (about 2 weeks’ earnings for a male servant), 
and warned him that “if he should again put on such trousers of this fashion, they 
shall, by virtue of the Princely Command, be confiscated”.89 In 1684, the Wildberg 
court ordered Hans Caspar Cuenz’s wife “to take off the neckerchief she had been 
wearing, because she is not permitted to wear it, and to set a good example to 
                                                     
86 On Württemberg, see Medick (1996), 384-91; Benscheidt (1985), 34-6, 226-30. On Germany more 
widely, see Bulst (1993); Knudsen (2002), 38-42, 52-8; on France up to c. 1750, see Moyer (1996), 
244-336. 
87 For an example from Wildberg, see HStAS A573 Bü. 94, Vogt-Rug-Gericht, 08.05.1710, Zettel 
between fols. 8 and 9; for similar exortations in another Württemberg community later in the eighteenth 
century, see Medick (1996), 299. 
88 PAW KKP, Vol. II, fol. 18r, 14.12.1660: “daß überhand genommene ... Klaid. Pracht”. 
89 PAW KKP, Vol. II, 3.10.1662, fol. 66r: “wegen getragener sehr weiter hosen, welche manier zu 
tragen Ihme nicht gebührt”; “wann Er solches hosen, vff diser manier widerumb anziehen solte, selbige 
crafft Frst: bevelchs confiscirt werden sollen”. 
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others”.90 In 1708, the Ebhausen church court admonished and penalized a proto-
industrial worsted-weaver’s wife for wearing ostentatiously large neckerchiefs.91  
 It might be argued that such prohibitions were merely futile gestures in the 
face of an ineluctable Consumer Revolution, were it not for the fact that people at the 
time took them quite seriously. Sumptuary penalties were regarded as forms of public 
shaming, important enough to motivate social resentments and enduring conflicts. In 
1682, for example, the local church court forbade the Wildberg barber-surgeon’s wife 
“to wear the prohibited clothing which violates the most recently published regulatory 
ordinance”, and threatened to report her to the princely authorities.92 The barber-
surgeon himself was  
summoned to the Town Hall, where several women had also been summoned 
on account of the clothing-ordinance, and Mr Pastor, in front of the women 
who were present, inspected him behind and before, and said that the small 
ribbon which he had on the collar of his coat also had to come off, and 
declared that they [the women] will themselves soon go down, and slapped his 
hand on the clothing-ordinance.  
The barber-surgeon declared in court that he “took all of this as a contumely, because 
it was discussed again and again among the people in the town”.93 This conflict over 
ribbon on the barber-surgeon’s collar, trivial though it might seem, gave rise to a feud 
in the community between the associates of the pastor and the surgeon, which lasted 
                                                     
90 PAW KKP, Vol. IV, fol. 252r, 18.1.1684: “ist vndersagt worden, Ihre tragende hals tüecher, weil es 
Ihren nicht gebührt zuetragen abzuelegen, Vnd andern mit einem Exempel vorzuegehen”. 
91 PAE KKP, Vol. II, fol. 46r, 15.7.1708.  
92 PAW KKP, Vol. IV, fol. 215r, 5.5.1682: “die verbottenen Klaider welche der Jüng. publicierten 
Policey Ordnung zue wider ... ablegen thüe”. 
93 PAW KKP, Vol. IV, fol. 221v, 7.6.1682: “Er vff daß Rathhauß er fordert: da etliche weiber wegen 
deß Klaider Tax, auch vor beschaid. word. habe herr Specialis vor denen anweßened. weibern Ihne 
hind. vnd vornnen besichtigt vnd gesagt die Schnierlen, so Er vff dem vmbschlag Seines rockhs gehabt, 
müeß. auch herab, warüber Er vermeldt, Sie werd. selbsten baldt herab gehen, In deme Sie abgetrag. 
werd., vnd vff die Klaider Ordnung die hand geschlagen, welches Er vor einen Spott [ins.: weil solches 
hin vnd wider in der Statt vnder den leüthen auß gesagt word.] vffgenommen”. 
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for nine years, occupied three communal court sittings, and issued in several reports to 
the princely authorities.94  
 In a similar way, a sermon against luxurious dress delivered by the Ebhausen 
pastor in 1708 was perceived by Magdalena, the wife of Peter Schöttlin, as an attempt 
to shame her publicly. Magdalena had already been twice forbidden to wear “her 
excessively large neckerchief, which she is accustomed to wearing above her station”. 
She reacted to the pastor’s public reprimand by remarking to a group of neighbours a 
few days later that “if the pastor doesn’t have anything better to preach about than 
neckerchiefs, he could well refrain from doing it altogether”. She was then summoned 
before the community church court, where she denied being rude about the sermon 
but again refused to take off the neckerchief, whereupon the church censors fined her 
11 Kreuzer – more than a day’s average earnings for a local worsted-weaver. 95 
 When exhortations, sermons, public reprimands, court hearings, gossip, fines, 
and confiscation did not succeed, communities resorted to heavier penalties. People 
who violated the clothing regulations could find themselves or their families denied 
communal welfare. In 1687, for instance, when Jacob Zeyher’s widow petitioned for 
poor relief, the Wildberg church court refused, on the grounds that “this Zeyherin’s 
son and daughter have let themselves be seen in clothing above what is fitting and this 
implies that they can probably come by other means and can support their old mother, 
for which reason her children are reminded to care for their mother in accordance with 
filial obligation”.96 In 1703, the Ebhausen community church court summoned the 
                                                     
94 PAW KKP, Vol. IV, fol. 215r, 5.5.1682; PAW KKP, Vol. IV, fol. 220r-222v, 7.6.1682; PAW KKP, 
Vol. V, fol. 100v-103v, 19.4.1691. 
95 PAE KKP, Vol. II, fol. 46r, 15.7.1708: “wegen ihres überaus großen halßtuches, welches sie über 
ihren Stand zutragen pfleget”; “wann der Pfarrer nichts wisse zu predig., als von halßtüchern, könne ers 
wol bleiben lassen”. 
96 PAW KKP, Vol. V, fol. 64v, 4.2.1687: “weilen dißer Zeyherin Sohn vnd Tochtern sich in Klaider 
über gebihr sehen laßen vnd so her gehen dz sie wohl anderster Kommen: vnd Ihre alte Muetter 
erhalten Könten, Alß waißt man Ihro nit zue willfahren, sondern Ihre Kinder werden Crafft der 
Kindischen schuldigkeit anerjnnert Ihr Mueter zue verpfleg.”. 
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“house-poor people” in the village so that a list could be drawn up for the district 
authorities, but took advantage of having the village poor assembled before them, by 
“additionally giving severe warnings to various widows, that they shall refrain from 
the loose gossip and other disgraceful trouble-making that has hitherto occurred 
among them, especially at spinning-bees, and also from excessiveness in clothing”.97 
For this group of women, poor relief was tacitly made dependent on refraining from 
two manifestations of the Industrious Revolution – working at spinning-bees and 
buying new clothes. 
 Sumptuary regulations were thus enforced at least sufficiently to provide an 
instrument for “social disciplining”. A unique documentary survival from the 
eighteenth century, moreover, suggests even more systematic enforcement. For the 
community of Wildberg, there survives a single booklet of “Polizei-Tax-Rechnungen” 
(regulatory fine accounts), which lists all the clothing fines levied over a 12-month 
period between February 1713 and February 1714.98 Similar registers of clothing fines 
survive for other parts of Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
suggesting that such systematic, local enforcement was not unique to Württemberg.99  
 The register from Wildberg makes it possible to identify the targets of 
sumptuary regulation. As Table 8 shows, over this 12-month period, 110 individuals 
in a community of only about 1,300 inhabitants were fined for wearing forbidden 
garments. Most were fined for more than one offence, as shown by the fact that the 
register recorded 218 prohibited garments, most of them small items of silk or calico.  
 
                                                     
97 PAE KKP, Vol. II, fol. 19r, 1.5.1703: “die haußarme Leutt”; “darneben etlichen Wittib. ernstl. 
Verweißung gethan, daß sie des loßen geschwäzes, Vnd andern schändlichen Vnwesens, so bißher bey 
v. Vnter ihnen, v. sonderlich in Liechtgäng Vorgelauff., auch Übermuths in Kleidern bemüssig. soll.” 
98 HStAS A573 Bü. 6712, fol. 3r-6v, 1713-14. 
99 On Germany and Switzerland, see, for instance, Bulst (1993), 34-6; on France, see Moyer (1996), 
244-336. 
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Table 8:
Violations of Consumption Regulations, by Sex and Household Status,
Wildberg, February 1713 to February 1714
Sex and Female Male Unknown sex Total
household status no. % fine no. % fine no. % fine no. % fine
Adult male 0 0 n/a 4 57 13.50 0 0 n/a 4 4 13.50
Widow 1 1 3.00 0 0 n/a 0 0 n/a 1 1 3.00
Wife 61 61 6.16 0 0 n/a 0 0 n/a 61 55 6.16
Offspring 18 18 6.17 3 43 3.00 3 100 4.00 24 22 5.50
Servant 7 7 6.43 0 0 n/a 0 0 n/a 7 6 6.43
Relative 6 6 4.50 0 0 n/a 0 0 n/a 6 5 4.50
Independent woman 7 7 5.57 0 0 n/a 0 0 n/a 7 6 5.57
Total 100 100 6.01 7 100 9.00 3 100 4.00 110 100 6.15
Source:  HSAS A573 Bü. 6712 (Polizeiregister), 1709/17, fol. 3r-6v.
Note:  Fine = mean fine imposed (in Kreuzer).
 
 
 Although some of these sumptuary fines were levied for men’s or children’s 
clothing, 91 per cent of those penalized in this register were female. This finding is 
consistent with sumptuary regulation throughout early modern Europe, which was 
directed disproportionately at women.100 Married women took pride of place, at 61 per 
cent of all females fined, a finding also consistent with European studies indicating 
that sumptuary laws emanated partly from men’s desire for institutional support to 
rein in wives’ spending. As one legislator declared in 1621, “laws may rule them 
though their husbands cannot”101 – a motive discussed further in the next section. But 
even a few unmarried daughters, maidservants, female relatives, and independent 
women living in lodgings were willing to allocate some of their meagre earnings to 
small fashionable garments – and to incur social opprobrium and monetary costs for 
doing so.  
                                                     
100 Hunt (1996), 251-4. 
101 Hunt (1996), 237 (quotation), 255-72. 
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 It might be argued that all these fines simply show that clothing regulations had 
no effect, as is sometimes claimed of sumptuary laws more generally. But fines, 
although they did not wholly prevent people from buying prohibited garments, 
increased their costs, as did public shaming, threats of confiscation, and denial of poor 
relief. This register, after all, records the consumption only of those who could afford to 
pay the fines on top of the cost of the garments. The typical fine inflicted in 1713 was 
non-trivial. Even for an adult male, the average clothing-fine was 13.5 Kreuzer, 1.7 
days’ average earnings for a proto-industrial worsted-weaver, the most important 
single occupation locally.102 For a woman, the average clothing-fine of 6 Kreuzer 
weighed more heavily – 2-5 days’ earnings for an independent spinner, more than 6 
days’ wages for a maidservant.103 A fine of this size did not make it impossible to 
indulge in new forms of consumption, but cannot fail to have deterred the marginal 
consumer, especially among women and the less well-off. The resentment and conflict 
that sumptuary controls evoked provides additional evidence that even those who 
could afford to violate them perceived them as a real constraint.  
 A second major target of sumptuary controls was the public consumption of food 
and drink, at taverns, markets, fairs, weddings, baptisms, funerals, and other non-
domestic venues. “Alimentary regulations” were common in many parts of Europe, 
including Württemberg, well into the eighteenth century.104 As with sartorial regulation, 
the social pressures for alimentary regulation were multifarious – maintaining social 
demarcations, reining in worldly display, controlling drunkenness, enforcing gender 
norms, and even preventing scarcity. Alimentary regulation, too, went far beyond 
normative exhortations: the legal provisions provided the rhetorical justification, but 
underlying social pressures motivated enforcement in everyday life.  
                                                     
102 For average weavers’ earnings, see Troeltsch (1897), 221-5. 
103 Ogilvie (2003), 304. 
104 Hunt (1996), 17-22, 33-40, 205, 251, 298-301, 359. 
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 Maintaining social demarcations was one major motivation. Alimentary 
regulations were enforced in practice against upwardly mobile members of the lower 
social orders who staged lavish weddings, baptismal suppers, and funerals aping the 
consumption patterns – and thus challenging the valued social status – of higher strata. 
Community courts – both temporal and communal – prosecuted excessive consumption 
at baptismal suppers and weddings, measured by the quantity of food or the number of 
guests.105 At least in some periods, this regulation was imposed quite systematically. 
Thus from 1713 to 1743, registers survive recording the graduated fines paid by 
townsmen and villagers in the district of Wildberg who violated the sumptuary 
ordinances by inviting “too many” guests to their wedding parties.106 
 A second major motivation for alimentary regulation was the notion that 
excessive extra-familial consumption of comestibles led to scarcity. The 1644 sumptuary 
ordinance, for instance, claimed that excessive non-household consumption was not only 
untraditional and dishonourable, but “inflated the prices of victuals and other 
necessities”.107 Men with families to support might buy food in the market, but as one 
Wildberg citizen complained at the 1660 community assembly, independent women 
(Eigenbrötlerinnen) should be ejected from the community because of their excessive 
market consumption: “in the market everything is grabbed away by them, and no citizen 
can get anything any more”.108  
 This case illustrates a third key concern of the alimentary regulations – 
controlling women’s behaviour. Württemberg taverns traditionally functioned as social 
spaces for both sexes, but from the later seventeenth century on, although groups of men 
                                                     
105 On baptismal suppers see, for instance, PAE KKP Vol. I, fol. 63v, 8.9.1695; PAE KKP Vol. I, fol. 
65r, 10.11.1695; PAE KKP Vol. I, fol. 66r, 21.12.1695. 
106 HStAS A573 Bü. 6712-4 (Polizei-Tax-Register), 1713-1743. 
107 “Zweite Polizeiordnung” (28.10.1644), in Reyscher (1828ff), Vol. 13, 41-4, here 42: “so wohl die 
Victualien, als andere zu hüll vnd füll benöhtigte Waaren gestaigert werden”. 
108 HStAS A573 Bü. 91, fol. 8r-v, 29.10.1660: “werde vff dem Marckht alles von Ihnen hinweg 
gerissen, könne kein burger nichts mehr bekommen”. 
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consuming bread and wine in taverns were tolerated, groups of women who did the same 
began to be fined and incarcerated, even when only seeking warmth.109 The controls 
were not limited to spinsters, but extended to married women and widows, even wives 
drinking alongside their husbands.110 Regulation of female tavern-going was thus 
motivated not so much by anxiety about spinsters exposing themselves to licentious 
contacts as by deeper concerns about the social implications of any woman 
consuming independently, outside the domestic sphere. 
 This is vividly illustrated by the accusation levelled in 1684 by the Ebhausen 
church court against Barbara Müller who, “on Michel Lodholtz’s accounting-day, 
remained in the tavern past closing-time and spoke very impudently, saying that she 
could earn 3 Batzen in a quarter of an hour, so what did it matter if she consumed 
something? ... unlike this tankard, she didn’t have a lid”.111 Barbara Müller evidently 
felt that a women who earned her own money was entitled to make her own 
consumption choices, including engaging in the individuated consumption of 
comestibles outside the household evoked in accounts of the English or Dutch 
Industrious Revolutions.112 But in Württemberg, it was precisely this combination of 
independent market work and independent market consumption by women that male 
elites found unacceptable. The village court sentenced Barbara Müller to three days and 
three nights in the house of discipline. Would such palpable penalties not have reduced 
incentives to work or consume in markets, even for such impudent women as Barbara 
Müller? 
                                                     
109 For examples, see PAE KKP, Vol. I, fol. 10v, 15.01.1682; PAE KKP, Vol. II, fol. 148r, 31.1.1716; 
and PAE KKP, Vol. VII, fol. 11v, 2.3.1785. 
110 For examples of married women and widows penalized for tavern-going, see PAW KKP, Vol. V, 
4.12.1705, fol. 252r-v; PAE KKP, Vol. II, fol. 85r, 20.08.1711; PAE KKP, Vol. II, fol. 103r, 
12.05.1713. 
111 PAE KKP, Vol. I, fol. 16r, 28.9.1684: “daß sie an Michel lodholtzen abrechnungs tag über Zeit im 
wirths hauß gebliben vnd damal. sich frecher weiß vernehmen laßen, sie Konn in einer Virtel stund 3 
batz. verdienen, wann sie schon etwz verzehre”; ibid., 7.11.1684: “sie hab auch kein deckhel, wie dz 
Käntlin”. 
112 De Vries (2003), 63. 
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 Sumptuary regulation appears to have intensified in Württemberg between c. 
1650 and c. 1750, alongside the administrative apparatus necessary for its 
implementation. Local courts monitored compliance, offenders were punished, and 
enforcement evoked resentment and conflict. This suggests that contemporaries 
regarded sumptuary controls as binding constraints. But how might we assess the 
broader, quantitative impact of such sumptuary regulation on the Consumer 
Revolution?  
 One promising avenue is to analyse the things people owned. Württemberg 
law mandated detailed marriage and post-mortem inventories, which survive for 
around four-fifths of ordinary citizens who reached adulthood and married.113 
Benscheidt’s analysis of 150 Nürtingen inventories between 1660 and 1840 detected a 
significant decline in clothing ownership between 1660 and 1780, followed by a huge 
increase up to 1840, which she ascribes partly to “the abolition of all clothing 
ordinances after the French Revolution”.114 Medick’s study of 444 inventories for the 
Württemberg village of Laichingen between 1747 and 1820 describes the gradual 
spread of small items of sartorial luxury, but also widespread compliance with the 
clothing regulations until the last quarter of the eighteenth century. It was only after c. 
1800, when the sumptuary regulations had been abolished, that the value of wives’ 
clothing surpassed that of husbands, female dress began commonly to include bright 
colours, exotic fabrics, ornamental accessories and forbidden trinkets, and sartorial 
display spread beyond the village elite to day-labourers and proto-industrial 
weavers.115  
                                                     
113 For a discussion of these sources, illustrating their potential to analyze consumption on the micro-
level, see Ogilvie, Küpker and Maegraith (2009 forthcoming). 
114 Benscheidt (1985), 34-6, 226-8, 230 (quotation). 
115 Medick (1996), 384-7, 398-406, 414, 427. 
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 These studies analyse only quite small samples of inventories and do not use 
multivariate statistical techniques, so they cannot establish whether changes in 
consumption followed changes in regulation, if different strata violated rules to 
differing degrees or followed differing chronologies, what other personal or 
community characteristics influenced consumption, and whether the pattern was 
replicated more widely across Württemberg. A new research project on “Human 
Well-Being and the “Industrious Revolution”: Consumption, Gender and Social 
Capital in a German Developing Economy, 1600-1900” is seeking answers to these 
questions using a larger sample (several thousand inventories), two communities (a 
town and a village), and a period of several centuries (1602-1899). By linking 
inventories to tax registers, censuses, and family reconstitutions, it will be able to 
analyse variations in consumption according to individual characteristics such as sex, 
age, fertility, household structure, occupation, taxable wealth, community citizenship, 
and communal office-holding, as well as exogenous variables such as sumptuary 
legislation and guild regulations.116  
 But even the scattered findings available so far show clearly that although 
people in early modern Württemberg may have been poorer and less highly informed 
than those in the Low Countries and England, they, too, sought to increase their 
market consumption after c. 1650.117 In doing so, however, they faced very different 
constraints. In Württemberg – as in many other early modern European economies – 
entrenched elites used their institutional powers and “social capital” to impose 
sumptuary norms, limiting the extent to which women and the lower social strata 
                                                     
116 This project is supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (RES-062-23-0759) 
between 2008 and 2012 (http://131.111.165.101/faculty/ogilvie/ ESRC-project-English.pdf) and builds 
on a database developed for the project “Economy, Gender, and Social Capital in the German 
Demographic Transition”, supported by the Leverhulme Trust (F/09 722/A) (see http:// 
www.hpss.geog.cam.ac.uk/research/projects/germandemography/).  
117 On this, see Benscheidt (1985), 65-8, 115-22, 226-30; Frey (1999), ch. 6; Medick (1996), ch. 5. 
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could transform their production decisions into new consumption choices. These 
institutional constraints survived well into the eighteenth century, and may therefore 
have influenced the timing and intensity of any revolution in consumption – and any 
corresponding incentive to increase industriousness – before c. 1800. 
 
4. Social Capital and Intra-Household Resource Allocation 
 
The Industrious and Consumer Revolutions place particular emphasis on married 
women’s reallocation of time and consumption from household to market.118 But the 
exact processes behind this shift are not wholly clear. Household time allocation and 
consumption are affected by bargaining between family members. Existing analyses 
of the Industrious Revolution describe wives’ bargaining position as being primarily 
affected by their earning-power – i.e. by interactions between family and market.119 
But what if other institutions intervened in this bargain? We have already seen how 
institutions widespread in many early modern European societies – guilds, 
communities, religious bodies, political authorities – affected women’s position in the 
market. Such institutions could also affect women’s position in the family, altering the 
bargains between spouses over time-allocation, income-sharing, and consumption 
choices. 
 Württemberg provides an instructive example of an economy in which non-
familial, non-market institutions influenced household decision-making. The 
willingness of communal, religious and political institutions to intervene inside 
households is illustrated by a database of 313 marital conflicts collected from the 
                                                     
118 De Vries (1992), esp. 118-9; De Vries (1994), 261; De Vries (2003), esp. 47; De Vries (2008), 14-
19, 97-109, 139-43, 179; McKendrick (1974), 197-200; Berg (1985), 169-72; Noordegraaf / Van 
Zanden (1995). 
119 De Vries (2008), 214-24. 
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church court minutes of two small Württemberg communities between 1650 and 
1800.120 Lacking figures for the three other jurisdictions that heard marriage conflicts 
in Württemberg (community, district, and consistorial courts), and lacking 
comparative figures for other European societies, we cannot say whether marital 
conflict in these Württemberg communities was especially high or low, but we can 
analyse its characteristics.  
 
Table 9:
Characteristics of Marital Conflict Cases, Church Court Records,
Wildberg 1646-1800 and Ebhausen 1674-1800
Marital conflict cases Town Villages Grand Total
no. % no. % no. %
Whole sample: 212 100 101 100 313 100
Initiated by community, church, state, neighbour 151 71 62 61 215 69
Initiated by wife 27 13 17 17 44 14
Initiated by wife plus wife's family 6 3 4 4 10 3
Initiated by wife's family 17 8 5 5 22 7
Initiated by husband 10 5 12 12 22 7
Initiated by husband's family 1 0 0 0 1 0
Initiated by couple 0 0 1 1 1 0
Sub-sample with conflict details: 169 100 89 100 258 100
Economic causes:
Any economic conflict 83 49 47 53 130 50
Husband bad householder 32 19 30 34 62 24
Wife bad householder 12 7 11 12 23 9
Property, inventory, marriage portion 14 8 11 12 25 10
Stealing within family 12 7 7 8 19 7
Food allocation or availability 20 12 24 27 44 17
Alcohol consumption 38 22 26 29 64 25
Other major causes:
Conflict with relatives 64 38 30 34 94 36
Verbal abusiveness 51 30 35 39 86 33
Sexual difficulties or jealousy 37 22 20 22 57 22
Physical violence:
By husband 73 43 43 48 116 45
By wife 13 8 7 8 20 8
By both spouses 11 7 5 6 16 6
Sources:  PAW KKP Vols. I-VII (1646-1800); Pfarrarchiv Ebhausen, KKP Vols. I-VII (1674-1800).
 
                                                     
120 For detailed analysis of this database, see Ogilvie (2003), 179-94. 
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 As Table 9 shows, one notable characteristic was that more than two-thirds of 
marital conflicts were brought before the court not by spouses themselves, or by their 
families, but by third parties. These included not only neighbours, but also – and to a 
much greater extent – community office-holders, church officials, and state officials. 
In Württemberg, spousal bargaining was a matter not just for the family but for the 
wider institutional framework.  
 A second notable characteristic is the importance of economic issues. Details 
survive of the causes of conflict in over four-fifths of cases. As Table 9 shows, the 
four main causes of spousal disputes were economic conflict, conflict with relatives, 
verbal abuse, and sexual difficulties. Of these, economic conflict was the most 
important, playing a role in half of all cases for which details are known, compared to 
about one-third for conflict with relatives and verbal abuse respectively, and about 
one-fifth for sexual difficulties. Economic conflicts were highly various – one-quarter 
of cases involved bad householding by the husband, one-quarter alcohol consumption, 
one-sixth food allocation, one-tenth land or property, one-tenth bad householding by 
the wife. But, as we shall see, marital disputes – and communal, church or state 
intervention – were evoked by a wide range of other economic issues.  
 One frequent flashpoint was a wife’s time-allocation. As we saw in Table 3, 
married women in Württemberg were both able and willing to work outside the 
household. Only 41 per cent of married women’s observed work was in household 
production, compared to 48 per cent in non-household work – 20 per cent in 
agriculture, 18 per cent in industry (crafts, proto-industry, spinning, milling), and 10 
per cent in tertiary activities (commerce, tavern-keeping, labouring).121 But the marital 
conflict database shows equally clearly that husbands thought that they should be in 
                                                     
121 For a detailed discussion, see Ogilvie (2003), 141-72; and Ogilvie (2008). 
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charge of deciding whether their wives worked.122 To give just two examples, in 1685 
a major issue in the conflict between the Wildberg tanner Hans Bernhardt 
Memminger and his wife Margaretha was that she had disobeyed him when he 
“forbade her to go out working any longer”.123 Similarly, in 1769, the main complaint 
of the Wöllhausen weaver Johann Martin Dengler against his wife Agnes Margaretha 
was that she “did spinning for strangers even though she had her own [wool] to spin ... 
and always wants to work more than he does”.124  
 When wives disobeyed, husbands regarded coercion as legitimate. As Table 9 
shows, nearly half of all marital conflict cases involved physical violence by 
husbands. One issue that evoked such violence was a wife’s market work, especially 
when it interfered with a husband’s definition of appropriate standards of household 
production. In 1666, for instance, Young Hanß Peürlin in Effringen justified beating 
his wife on the grounds that “she goes out of the house far too much and does not 
attend to the housekeeping, through which he is sometimes caused to become 
impatient”.125 In 1685, when Margaretha Memminger disobeyed her husband’s 
prohibition on her going out working any longer, “he beat her so that the blood ran 
down her front and back”.126 In 1769 Johann Martin Dengler of Ebhausen threatened to 
beat his wife Agnes Margaretha for spinning for other weavers rather than himself.127 In 
1778, the Wöllhausen weaver Daniel Dengler justified death threats against his wife 
on the grounds that she “is herself to blame for this, since she does not remain at 
home, but runs around among the houses”. He also explicitly requested reinforcement 
                                                     
122 For similar findings, see Roper (1989), 178-80. 
123 PAW KKP, Vol. V, fol. 28v, 24.1.1685: “hette Er Ihro verbotten solte den Schaffen nimmer gehen”. 
124 PAE KKP, Vol. V, p. 267, 19.4.1769: “daß sie frembden Leuten Wolle spinne, da sie doch ihre 
eigene zu spinnen habe ... und [ins.: immer] mehr schaffen wolle als er”. 
125 PAW KKP, Vol. III, 12.1.1666, p. 2: “Sie lauffe gar zuvihl auß dem hauß wartte der haußhaltung 
nicht ab, dardurch Er etwann Zuer vngeduldt vervrsacht werde”. 
126 PAW KKP, Vol. V, fol. 28v, 24.1.1685: “er sie geschlag. daß dz bluet hinden vnd vornen her ab 
gelauffen”. 
127 PAE KKP, Vol. V, p. 267, 19.4.1769. 
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by the communal church court, demanding that it “compel his wife, so that she 
remains at home”.128 In some of these cases, the court minutes are ambiguous about 
whether the husband is opposing his wife’s reallocating time to market production or 
to leisure activities outside the household, but most make it clear that his objection is 
to her willingness to work for outsiders instead of doing unpaid housework or 
spinning for him. In such cases, the court typically threw its weight behind the 
husband, sometimes feebly admonishing him for violence but always ordering the 
wife to obey him and “attend loyally to the householding, as befits an honourable 
wife”.129 
 Husbands consequently found that they could enforce their bargaining position 
within the household even more effectively by appealing to outside institutions 
manned by other married males, to whose fellow feeling they could explicitly appeal. 
In 1681, for instance, a Wildberg butcher who threatened his wife with a knife when 
she resisted his decisions about spousal time-allocation put it to the communal church 
court that, after all, “one can easily imagine that sometimes trouble arises between 
married people”.130 In 1771, the Ebhausen court had been receiving reports of the 
forest-warden’s wife-beating for years, but had no rejoinder to the man’s assertion 
that “he was the husband – after all, he had the right ... his wife was his own – he 
could treat her however he pleased”.131 The outcome was unsurprising. External 
institutions supported the husband’s control over a wife’s time, as in 1657 when the 
Wildberg court ordered that Friedrich Hosch’s 58-year-old wife should “in future not 
                                                     
128 PAE KKP, Vol. VI, 6.2.1778, fol. 43r-v: “sein Weib sey selbst Schuld daran, denn sie bleib nicht zu 
Haus, lauf nur in den Häusern herum”; “er bitte aber, man soll sein Weib dazu anhalten, daß sie zu 
Haus bleibe”. 
129 PAW KKP, Vol. III, 2.4.1669, p. 256-7: “der haußhaltung, wie einem Ehrlichen weib Zuestehet, 
getrewlich vorstehen”. 
130 PAW KKP, Vol. IV, fol. 199r-v, 22.4.1681: “könne mann ja leicht ermeßen, daß je mahlen eine 
ungelegenheit zwischen Eheleüthen geben”. 
131 PAE KKP, Vol. V, p. 254, 4.7.1772: “er seye der Mann – er habe doch recht ... er habe ein Weib vor 
sich – er dörfe sie tractiren, wie er wolle”. 
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go out of the house without her husband’s permission, in exchange for which her 
husband shall allow her to work”.132 In a society in which external institutions 
intervened inside marital disputes to support husbands, married women were less free 
to reallocate time from household to market production, and thus to fuel any 
Industrious Revolution. 
 Husbands also claimed control over wives’ and offspring’s market earnings. In 
1661, for instance, the Wildberg weaver Young Johannes Rempffer was “taking away 
from his wife and children the food that they earn bitterly with spinning”.133 Likewise, 
in 1793, the Ebhausen smith Hans Martin Hausen was demanding that his wife 
Barbara “give him half of her earnings, even though he earns little or nothing that he 
can give her”.134 If the husband could be demonstrated to be prodigal, the communal 
court might expostulate feebly, but it would also typically admonish the wife to yield. 
Thus in 1674, when the Wildberg butcher Hannß Geörg Steimblen threatened to kill his 
wife for not giving him 30 Kreuzer she had earned independently by selling ragout, 
the court fostered out their child for its own safety but ordered the wife to stay home 
with her husband, ineffectually warning both spouses “to treat each other better in 
future”.135 Where a husband’s bargaining position was reinforced by institutional 
support, a wife lost disposition over any money she might earn, which inevitably 
altered her incentives to allocate time to market work. 
 Husbands’ control over household resource allocation also extended to 
consumption. In 1689 a Gültlingen husband “locked the bread away, and when [his 
wife] asked for money to buy bread from the shoemaker, he said she didn’t need 
                                                     
132 PAW KKP, Vol. I, fol. 153r, 9.1.1657: “die fraw ins kunfftig ohne erlaubnuß deß mans nicht außer 
hauß gehen solle, hingegen der man Ihro Zueschaffen erlauben solle”. 
133 PAW KKP, Vol. II, fol. 43v, 25.10.1661: “weib vnd Kinder von Ihrer speiß [ins.: die] Sie mit 
spinnen Saur v.diennen weg nemme”. 
134 PAE KKP, Vol. VIII, p. 5, 31.5.1793: “fordere, daß sie ihm ihren halben Verdienst geben solle, u. er 
Verdien doch wenig oder nichts, das er ihr geben könne”. 
135 PAW KKP, Vol. III, p. 641-2, 12.6.1674: “ins Künfftig sich besser alß bishero beschehen, gegen 
[ins.: einander] Zue bezeügen”. 
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bread because he himself had already eaten”.136 In 1715 a weaver’s wife in Wildberg 
complained that “in her last childbed [her husband] had not let anything good be 
cooked for her, [and] she had had to eat oat gruel”.137 In 1770, a weaver’s wife from 
Wöllhausen ran away “because [her husband] gives her no money for bread, but 
rather makes use of it for other, less necessary things ... she had not really wanted to 
run away, but rather had only sought thereby to compel him to get some bread”.138 
Husbands also decided how much the dwelling would be warmed, as in 1772 when a 
Wöllhausen weaver’s wife “could not stay in their main room in the daytime because 
[her husband] heats it little or not at all”.139 The court might admonish a husband who 
demonstrably deprived his wife of basic sustenance, but would also typically instruct 
the wife “to show and conduct herself toward her husband peacefully and modestly ... 
and not give him cause to give her trouble”.140  
 A husband’s control over money earnings translated directly into control over 
even the most basic forms of household consumption such as meals and warmth. 
When it came to market consumption, his control over money earnings was even 
more decisive, especially when, as so often happened, it was reinforced by external 
institutional intervention. In 1715, for instance, Young Hans Georg Hezel’s wife in 
Wildberg lamented that “he does not let her have any shirts and clothes made, for 
which reason lice and vermin inevitably grow on her [and] her mother has to provide 
her clothes”; the community court merely ordered both spouses to behave better, and 
                                                     
136 PAW KKP, Vol. V, fol. 87r-v, 23.5.1689: “er Ihro dz brodt ein beschloßen vnd alß sie gesagt solte 
Gelt hohlen beim Schuehmacher dz sie brod Kauffen Können, er Ihro zur antwort geben sie brauche 
Kein brodt er habe schon Geßen”. 
137 PAW KKP, Vol. V, 1.3.1715, fol. 318r: “Er habe Ihro zu theürst in ferndig. kindbett nichts guts 
kochen laßen, Sie habe haber brey eßen müßen”. 
138 PAE KKP, Vol. V, p. 205, 28.7.1770: “Weil er ihro Kein Geld zu brode gegeben, sondern solches 
zu andern weniger nöthigen dingen verbraucht ... sie habe nicht eigentlich verlauffen wollen, sondern 
ihn nur damit nöthigen wollen, daß er brod anschaffen solle”. 
139 PAE KKP, Vol. V, p. 258, 12.10.1772: “bey tag könne sie nicht in ihrer Stuben seyn, weil er solche 
wenig oder gar nicht einheize”. 
140 PAW KKP, Vol. III, 2.4.1669, p. 256-7: “sich geg. Ihme Ihrem Mann auch fridlich vnd bescheid. 
erZaig. vnd v.halten: ... vnd Ihme Zuer vngelegenheit nicht vrsach geb. Solle”. 
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the wife to be cleaner.141 In 1767, the alcoholic and prodigal Wöllhausen weaver 
Johann Martin Dingler “refused to provide [his wife] with a necessary skirt”, but 
when she sold two tablecloths to get the money to buy clothes, accused her of “being 
untrue to him in the domestic economy, with table and store-chest, and being a 
gadabout who never stayed home” – charges on which she was then closely 
interrogated by the community court.142 In a society in which communal and religious 
institutions supported husbands’ control over consumption decisions, wives – whether 
or not they were allowed to work outside the household – were less likely contribute 
to a Consumer Revolution by purchasing market fashions. 
 Occasionally a women secured some protection by bringing her husband to 
court, especially if she could portray his behaviour as burdening the wider 
community. The authorities sometimes penalized a blatantly prodigal husband even 
while they ordered the wife to submit in order to keep the marriage intact. But this 
should not lead us to conclude that communal, religious, or state institutions treated 
spouses impartially, let alone that they favoured wives, as has been argued by some 
scholars.143 Communal and state authorities had their own priorities, high among them 
the desire to sustain marriages at almost any cost in order to ensure tax payments and 
prevent welfare burdens. Guild, community and state regulations that reduced 
women’s earning capacity (discussed above in Section 1) created powerful incentives 
for the authorities to keep married couples together and to support the husband as the 
major earner. Furthermore, communal and religious courts were manned by male 
householders who shared the perspective of accused husbands whom, as fellow 
                                                     
141 PAW KKP, Vol. V, 1.3.1715, fol. 318r: “Er laße Ihro Keine Hembd. und Klaid. machen, dahero 
noth wendig c: v. lauß und ohngezifer an Ihro wachsen laßen müße, Ihre Mutter müße Sie Klaid. 
laßen”. 
142 PAE KKP, Vol. V, p. 219, 30.1.1767: “Sie habe nicht weiter als zwey tisch tücher weggegeben, und 
ihr davor einen nöthigen Rock, den er ihr nicht habe anschaffen wollen”; “sie seye ihm im Haus-
Weßen da und dorten [ins.: in tisch und Kasten] ungetreu geweßen; sie seye eine Ausläuferin, bleibe 
nie daheim”. 
143 Medick (1991), 55-6; Sabean (1990), 124-46, 176-8. 
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citizens and guild members, they were reluctant to disoblige. This led courts to inflict 
an abusive husband with often risibly feeble penalties while ordering his wife “to give 
way to her husband in future”,144 “to conduct herself toward her husband peacefully and 
modestly ... and not give him cause to give her trouble”,145 “to greet him virtuously at 
all times, thereby protecting herself from misfortune’146 – in short, to defer to his 
resource allocation decisions. 
 Institutional support for husbands in household bargaining, as studies of 
modern developing economies suggest, affects basic aspects of production and 
consumption that would have been key variables in any Industrious Revolution. For 
one thing, depriving women of consumption reduces their productivity, reinforcing 
incentives to allocate them less consumption, thereby creating a self-sustaining cycle 
of reduced production and consumption by females.147 Second, men’s consumption 
choices may focus more on their own individual gratification (particularly with 
alcohol and tobacco), while women more often seek the well-being of the entire 
household, particularly the nutritional and health status of children.148 Third, women 
may be more likely than men to allocate income to staples of the Consumer 
Revolution such as clothing, furnishings, or market comestibles.149 Institutional 
support for husbands in household bargaining thus not only redistributed resources 
from women to men (thereby reducing women’s welfare), but created incentives 
reducing women’s market production and consumption (thereby reducing efficiency 
and growth in the wider economy). 
                                                     
144 PAW KKP, Vol. V, fol. 315v, 4.1.1715. 
145 PAW KKP, Vol. III, fol. 256-7, 2.4.1669. 
146 PAE KKP, Vol. I, fol. 82v, 9.12.1697. 
147 Dasgupta (1993), 305-36, 401-511. 
148 For modern economies, see Dasgupta (1993), 471-2; for historical ones, see Ogilvie (2003), 193-4, 
349-51. 
149 De Vries, 47-8, 133-44. 
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 Without analogous studies for different European societies, we cannot 
compare how women’s bargaining position within households was affected by 
different institutional frameworks. The near invisibility of such institutional 
interventions inside households in studies of the Industrious Revolution in England or 
the Netherlands might be taken as prima facie evidence that they did not play the 
active role there that they did in Württemberg. Comparative studies of “social 
disciplining” certainly conclude that control of private life by community, church, or 
state was less effective in the early modern north Atlantic societies than in central, 
southern or Nordic Europe.150 Comparative studies also tend to confirm that early 
modern Dutch and English women enjoyed an unusually strong position in household 
and market.151 This is not to say that spouses in England or the Low Countries did not 
conflict over time-allocation and consumption, but that husbands there had fewer and 
weaker outside institutions to which they could appeal to shore up their bargaining 
power in such household conflicts. If future scholarship bears out these comparisons 
for the sphere of household bargaining, then the relative weakness of institutionalized 
social capital in England and the Netherlands, compared to societies such as 
Württemberg, may turn out to have been a crucial variable in enabling an early and 
vigorous Industrious Revolution. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper began with three open questions about the Consumer and Industrious 
Revolutions. Did they happen outside the early-developing North Atlantic economies? 
Were they shaped by the “social capital” of institutions other than family and market? 
                                                     
150 See the literature surveyed in Ogilvie (2006). 
151 Schmidt (2007); Van den Heuvel (2007); Van Nederveen Meerkerk (2006). 
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And how were they affected by social constraints on women? Evidence from 
Württemberg, a late-developing, non-Atlantic economy where non-familial, non-market 
institutions observably influenced both sexes’ economic options, sheds light on these 
questions. 
 Economic agents – especially women – did seek to reallocate time from 
household to market in early modern Württemberg. But their ability and incentive to 
become more “industrious” was affected by a wide array of institutional constraints. 
Communal institutions restricted women’s market work where it threatened or 
annoyed entrenched interests. Guilds, communities and state authorities capped the 
wages and piece-rates that could be charged by spinners, servants, and other 
dependent workers, and enforced unusually low female-male wage ratios. Guilds 
excluded women – as well as youths and adult male outsiders – from many of the 
industrial and commercial occupations in which they were most productive and hence 
best able to earn. Church courts forbade work at religiously prohibited times and 
prevented women from minimizing costs via spinning-bees. Institutionalized “social 
capital” thus restricted the incentive and capacity – particularly of women and lower-
status males – to allocate more time to market work, and thus to power an Industrious 
Revolution on the Dutch or English model. 
 Social capital also influenced the Consumer Revolution through commerce. 
Craft guilds in economies such as Württemberg restricted trade in industrial inputs and 
outputs to their own privileged, mainly male members. Community and state 
regulations reserved trade in many primary products to their producers, penalizing 
middlemen as “regraters”. Retailers’ guilds reserved trade in most other wares to their 
own members and a few outside applicants who begged or purchased guild permits or 
state dispensations. The privileged few who monopolized the legal licenses mobilized 
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corporate, communal and state institutions to prosecute “encroachers”. This was 
reflected in economic outcomes, with retail ratios in strongly guilded German territories 
much lower than those in the Netherlands and England where guilds were weaker and 
more flexible. Corporative social capital thus hindered the new traders and commercial 
practices that brought new market wares within the knowledge and budgets of poorer 
social groups during the Dutch and English Consumer Revolutions. 
 A third effect of social capital was to facilitate sumptuary regulation. In many 
European economies between c. 1650 and c. 1750, elites supported sumptuary 
regulations to demarcate their own social status. Male householders supported 
sumptuary controls to prevent female licentiousness and resist wives’ and daughters’ 
demand for new fashions. Guild masters lobbied for sumptuary regulations to protect 
their markets from exotic imports. Church elders favoured sumptuary “discipline” to 
limit worldly adornment and lavish sociability. And the state supported sumptuary 
laws to make citizens spend less so they could pay more in taxes. Together, these 
social pressures created powerful local constituencies favouring sumptuary controls 
well into the eighteenth century. Perfect enforcement was not necessary. Local 
records show that the controls were enforced sufficiently to limit purchases of clothes 
and comestibles by marginal consumers, particularly women (the main targets) and 
the poor (who could not afford the penalties) – key groups of new consumers in the 
English and Dutch Consumer Revolutions. 
 Finally, the social capital of non-familial, non-market institutions affected 
bargaining inside households. Where communal and religious institutions were strong, 
husbands mobilized them to shore up their control over wives’ time-allocation, 
earnings, and consumption choices. This inevitably reduced women’s ability to do 
market work, their incentive to do so, the income they earned, and their autonomy in 
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spending it. The relative absence in the Netherlands and England of such institutional 
interventions in spousal bargaining may have facilitated an earlier and more vigorous 
reallocation of time and consumption by women, powering the Industrious Revolution. 
 These findings for Württemberg help answer our opening questions. Populations 
outside the North Atlantic economies did desire to work and consume in the market 
between 1650 and 1800, generating some symptoms of the Industrious Revolution. But 
the extent to which they could implement these desires was constrained by guilds, 
communities, religious bodies, political authorities, and many other institutions. 
Entrenched elites who perceived new work and consumption practices as threats used 
these institutions to generate a “social capital” of norms, information, sanctions and 
collective action to oppose them. Although they seldom succeeded in blocking new 
practices wholly, they often delayed them, limited them socially, or increased their 
costs. They deployed such social capital particularly strongly against less powerful 
groups such as women, migrants, and the poor – central agents in any Consumer or 
Industrious Revolution. 
 Cross-country comparisons suggest that such institutionalized social capital 
varied across early modern societies. It was widespread in many parts of central, nordic, 
eastern and southern Europe but relatively weak in the societies of the north Atlantic 
seaboard which were the cradle of the Industrious Revolution. Even in England and the 
Netherlands, the institutional powers of privileged elites were not altogether moribund 
after 1650, which may explain why the Industrious Revolution was less visible in 
some regions and social contexts there.152  
 This analysis suggests that we may reap large dividends by focussing on 
economies where growth and development came late. Perhaps these economies had 
                                                     
152 See Overton et al. (2004) on regional variations in England; and Van den Heuvel (2007) on social 
and regional variations in the Dutch Republic. 
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their Industrious Revolutions but it led to nothing in terms of economic development. 
This would cast doubt on the broader logic of the Industrious and Consumer 
Revolutions – the idea that reallocating time and consumption from household to 
market prepares the way for modern economic growth. Alternatively, late-developing 
economies may not even have had an Industrious Revolution because it was stifled by 
institutional constraints. If so, then claims that social institutions are efficient or 
irrelevant to long-term economic growth must be wrong. Studying why some 
economies developed late may thus be central to understanding why other economies 
developed at all.  
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